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ABSTRACT
The battle for cyber supremacy is a cat and mouse game: evolving threats from internal and external
sources make it difficult to protect critical systems. With the diverse and high risk nature of these
threats, there is a need for robust techniques that can quickly adapt and address this evolution.
Existing tools such as Splunk, Snort, and Bro help IT administrators defend their networks by
actively parsing through network traffic or system log data. These tools have been thoroughly
developed and have proven to be a formidable defense against many cyberattacks. However, they
are vulnerable to zero-day attacks, slow attacks, and attacks that originate from within. Should an
attacker or some form of malware make it through these barriers and onto a system, the next layer
of defense lies on the host. Host level defenses include system integrity verifiers, virus scanners,
and event log parsers. Many of these tools work by seeking specific attack signatures or looking
for anomalous events. The defenses at the network and host level are similar in nature. First,
sensors collect data from the security domain. Second, the data is processed, and third, a response
is crafted based on the processing. The application level security domain lacks this three step
process. Application level defenses focus on secure coding practices and vulnerability patching,
which is ineffective. The work presented in this thesis uses a technique that is commonly employed
by malware, dynamic-link library (DLL) injection, to develop dynamic application level security
sensors that can extract fine-grain data at runtime. This data can then be processed to provide
stronger application level defense by shrinking the vulnerability window. Chapters 5 and 6 give
proof of concept sensors and describe the process of developing the sensors in detail.
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PREFACE
This document was written to help readers understand that gaps exist in current defensive tech-
niques. It provides a possible solution to shrink the vulnerability window by filling one such gap.
Several of the topics discussed throughout this thesis, such as code injection, reverse engineering,
and shellcode examples, are taboo or carry negative connotations. Dynamic-link library injection
is often used by attackers to execute code stealthily. Reverse engineering is often used to find
attackable vulnerabilities or steal intellectual property. It is possible to take these techniques plus
the additions presented in this thesis to create harmful software. For example, an attacker could
use dynamic application level security sensors to harvest information, such as passwords, credit
card numbers, and other important data. The intentions of this work are not to create a cookbook
for developing harmful software but rather to introduce new methods to defend against malicious
software. In light of these potential dangers, complete source code for the examples has not been
provided.
vi
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Significance
Cyberspace is an amorphous global interconnected network of networks that seems to be growing
without bounds. Over the last decade, the breadth and complexity of cyberspace has vastly ex-
panded to encompass more than just physically connected computers. The cyberspace domain now
extends its reach to mobile devices, social networks, and other physical and virtual elements.
Accompanying this growth is an increase in cybercrime. Cybersecurity policies attempt to defend
against attacks, disruptions, and other threats to information infrastructures. Such infrastructures
include computers, computer networks, software systems, and the information they contain and
communicate [9]. Recent federal policy documents emphasize the importance of cybersecurity to
the welfare of modern society. They classify cyberattacks as “a new kind of threat to the safety and
well-being of the United States,” and describe America’s failure to protect cyberspace as “one of
the most urgent national security problems [26].” Further, these documents outline cybersecurity
priorities and discuss the factors that contribute to the difficulty of securing cyberspace [4] [18] [20].
These factors include the increase in quantity and sophistication of cyberattacks and the complexity
of the cyberdomain.
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Figure 1.1: Unique malware from 2006 to first half of 2009 seen by Avert Labs [28]
Cyberattacks are growing exponentially in numbers. In 2008 malicious software increased an
estimated 350% from levels in 2007 [12]. According to Kaspersky Lab analysts, there were 2,227,415
new malicious programs on the Internet in 2007, a four-fold increase on the results from 2006, with
a volume of 354 GB [21]. In the first half of 2009, Avert labs saw almost as much new malware
as in all of 2008 [28]. Figure 1.1 shows this growth. Panda labs predicted that malware in 2009
would grow and become more sophisticated and difficult to detect [34]. They claimed cyberspace
would see an increase in web-based attacks, attacks through social networks, and attacks on non-
Windows platforms such as Mac OS X Leopard, Linux, and iPhone. Each of these claims came
true. In January 2009 Twitter suffered attacks that resulted in the compromise of thirty-three high
profile accounts including an account belonging to President Barack Obama [39]. In 2009, unlocked
iPhones, that is devices that have been unlocked from the manufacture’s proprietary restrictions,
met their first worm, which changed the user’s operating system wallpaper to an image of 1980’s
pop star Rick Astley with a message that said, “ikee is ever gonna give you up [13].”
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Figure 1.2: Underground malware black market posting of attacks on a website [12]
Second, the increasing sophistication of cyberattacks makes them harder to defend against. For
example, malware can detect and neutralize antivirus software before the antivirus software detects
the infiltration [30]. Other malware, such as the Storm worm, use polymorphic code that regularly
transforms itself to thwart traditional antivirus and intrusion detection [43]. Further, malware
authors are adopting software engineering’s best practices that allow for faster deployment and
higher quality code.
This increase in sophistication is driven by both political and economic agendas. Nation-states,
militaries, and foreign intelligence services have the resources to commit acts of cyberwar through
the anonymity of the internet. Quality malware can be purchased in underground software black
markets. Botnet access can be purchased for as little as $225, keystroke loggers for $23, and
phishing kits for $10 [1]. If a hacker desires to take down a website, it would only cost $50 per day
it is down [12]. Figure 1.2 above shows a forum post of a hacker offering a distributed denial of
service attack.
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Finally, many levels of complexity makes securing the cyberdomain difficult. The information
technology infrastructure is a complicated global system of hardware, software, operating systems,
data, networks, and people. In Sally Floyd’s paper, Difficulties in Simulating the Internet, she
attributes the challenges faced on internet modeling and simulation to the heterogeneity and dy-
namic nature of the networks. She details the internet as changing rapidly and unpredictably [11].
Further, a 2005 Congressional Research Service report for Congress stated that, “the complexity
of cyberspace and its components, even within organizations, makes it both difficult to test and to
predict how systems will behave under unusual circumstances, such as those that might rise from
an unanticipated cyber attack [9].”
1.2 Approach
Many techniques exist for defending against cyberattacks. These techniques include firewalls,
least user privileges, network intrusion detection systems, system integrity verifiers, secure coding
practices, and vulnerability patching. Combining these elements forms a defense-in-depth security
policy. At the network and host level, software-based intrusion detection systems collect data from
customized sensors. The collected data is then processed and a response is crafted if any threats
are detected. The application level focuses on secure coding practices and vulnerability patching.
It lacks the sensors, analysis, and response of the network and host levels.
The granularity of the data collected depends on the security domain protected by the defensive
mechanism. The work presented in this thesis expands the application level security domain to
include sensors that are dynamically added to the application at runtime. This addition is accom-
plished through dynamic-link library injection and reverse engineering. The results are sensors that
can extract fine-grain data at the application level.
1.3 Assumptions
There are many factors that contribute to the complexity of developing dynamic application level
security sensors. These factors include but are not limited to the operating system, processor, and
4
target application. In order to simplify this complexity, the work presented in this thesis makes
several assumptions.
The first assumption is that the operating system of the host machine is some version of Microsoft
Windows. As of January 3, 2010, Microsoft Windows has a market share of 92.2%, making it the
most common operating system in existence [23]. While the general methods described in this thesis
are possible on operating systems other than Windows, the implementations of specific elements
may vary. For example, the techniques for process injection differ between Linux and Windows.
Additionally, there are differences among Windows versions that contribute to the complexity. For
example, the virtual memory location for the start of the stack in Windows XP is static where as it
is dynamic in Windows 7. While it is worth noting these differences, they are not extreme enough
to warrant an assumption about the version of the operating system. The example presented in
Chapters 5 was developed for Windows 7, and the example presented in Chapter 6 was developed
for Windows XP.
The second assumption is that the processor of the host machine is either an x86-based Intel or
AMD microprocessor. This assumption simplifies reverse engineering because it fixes the instruction
set architecture (ISA). There are no assumptions about the number of cores on the system, however,
the processor must support threading.
The third assumption is that the target application was developed in C, C++, or x86 assembly.
Many newer programming languages, such as Java, Visual Basic .Net, and C#, have virtual run
time environments or just-in-time compilers. This results in applications that are innately less
vulnerable than traditional C or C++ applications.
The fourth assumption is that the injected binary code is in the form of a dynamic-link library.
This simplifies the runtime process injection. It is possible to inject code that is in the form of an
executable, string, or precompiled shell code, but these techniques are not addressed in this work.
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Finally, the last assumption is that some form of code execution is already running on the system.
In the case of stealthy execution, this may be in the form of an exploited vulnerability, and in the
case of friendly execution, the code can be manually initiated.
These assumptions will help simplify the complexity of the addition of dynamic application level
security sensors. They also focus the efforts of the work presented in this thesis. Keep in mind
that many of these assumptions can be relaxed and that the methods can be implemented on
other operating systems, processors, and forms of code. The next chapter will discuss the internal
workings of several existing defensive techniques and the level at which they operate.
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Chapter 2
Existing Defensive Techniques
There are many existing defensive tools, both commercial and open source, such as network in-
trusion detection systems, virus scanners, and anti-phishing filters. Each of these attempts to
protect their particular security domains. Unfortunately attackers continue to capitalize on the
copious weaknesses that are innate to these methods. By the time an attack is discovered, if one
is discovered at all, the damage has already been done. The focus of this research is to shrink the
vulnerability window by adding techniques that strengthen the application level security domain.
The chapter discusses the spectrum of existing defensive techniques and highlights the need for
application level security methods.
In general there is a three step process that is common in the existing defensive techniques. The
first step is to collect data through custom sensors. The sensor then passes the collected data to
the data processing unit for analysis. Based on the results of the analysis the defensive system
may choose to respond to an event. This three step process, which is shown in Figure 2.1, is
a reoccurring theme throughout this thesis, and can be seen in each of the defensive techniques
detailed in this chapter. In order to better understand the new cybersensors presented in this
research, it is important to understand the inner workings of existing defensive techniques and
their security domains.
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Figure 2.1: Three step process taken by defense systems
2.1 Network Level Security Domain
In the classic defense-in-depth strategy, network level protection systems are the “external layer
focus area [29].” They are the first technological line of defense against outside attackers. The
network level security domain has both hardware and software defenses that attempt to provide
information assurance through a combination of firewalls, proxies, authentication techniques, role-
based access controls, and network analyzers. In order to properly compare application level sensors
to sensors in other security domains, this section will focus on sensor-based software defenses,
particularly network intrusion detection systems.
2.1.1 Network Intrusion Detection Systems
Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) work by monitoring network traffic. They look for
suspect behavior such as denial of service attacks, worm propagations, or attempts to install a
backdoor root kit. For example a large number of TCP connection requests to many different ports
for a particular machine would indicate a TCP port scan, which is often used by worms attempting
to propagate [14]. These intrusion detection systems work by parsing through network packet logs.
Their full functionality can be generalized into the previously discussed three step process.
First, a sensor collects data from the network lines. The data is then displayed to the screen for
human parsing, logged to disk for analysis later, or passed directly to the NIDS data analysis step.
If an attack is successful, log files can be forensically studied in order to build a signature through
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the attack sequence.
Next, the NIDS processes the collected data through protocol and content analysis. There are
two major ways to perform this kind of analysis. Signature matching attempts to identify known
attack sequences by comparing incoming network traffic to a database of previously detected attack
sequences. It is not unusual for commercial NIDS to have large signature databases. The drawback
to this technique is that it is limited to detecting attacks in the system’s repository. Since the
quantity of attacks is increasing, these systems quickly become outdated. It is crucial to keep the
signatures, also referred to as rules, up to date.
Anomaly-based systems attempt to compare the incoming traffic to a profiled normal baseline
for the network. This makes them prime candidates for detecting zero-day attacks. The problem
with anomaly-based systems is that if they are trained using data tainted with attacks, they include
those attacks in the baseline as normal behavior. This problem can be overcome through training
in an isolated clean environment, and using signatures to check the training data.
Finally, the system responds to any detected anomalous behavior. In many cases a response may
be as simple as notifying system administrators that something suspicious has been detected. This
can be problematic if the NIDS floods the operators with false detections [31]. False positives is
a problem all detection systems face, however at the network level the problem is heightened by
the volume of data analyzed. It is not uncommon for the system to filter out the IP address of the
attacker or terminate the TCP session.
Network intrusion detection systems are powerful tools. However, they are vulnerable to slow
attacks and attacks that originate from within. Next, two examples of network intrusion detection
systems are described.
Example: Snort - A Network Intrusion Detection System
Snort is an example of one of the most commonly used NIDS. It is an open source system that has
over 270,000 registered users and millions of downloads worldwide [46]. It provides a lightweight
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framework that uses both signature and anomaly-based inspection methods to perform traffic anal-
ysis and packet logging on IP networks. Snort can be configured to run in one of four separate
modes. First, it can run in sniffer mode where the sensor simply reads the packets from the net-
work and continuously displays them on the screen. Second, it can run in packet logger mode. In
this mode it records all of the network traffic to the hard drive, which is particularly useful for
forensically determining the cause of a successful attack. Third, it runs in NIDS mode where the
sensor completes the three step process described at the beginning of this chapter. Finally, Snort
can run in inline mode where it obtains packets from iptables instead of libpcap [47].
Example: Bro - A Network Intrusion Detection System
Bro is another example of a commonly used network intrusion detection system. Designed for UNIX,
its functionality is similar to Snort. Bro introduces some powerful features that are not found in
Snort, such as a custom scripting language known as “Bro language.” This scripting language allows
users the ability to write or modify policies that govern the sort of activities deemed unacceptable
on the network. It also includes a tool called “snort2bro” that converts Snort signatures into
Bro signatures and reduces the number of false positives [3]. Even with these network intrusion
detection systems, attacks are still successful.
2.1.2 Network Level Security Domain Summary
Network administrators attempt to defend the network level security domain from malicious out-
siders through a combination of policy and hardware and software solutions. This section in par-
ticular focused on network level intrusion detection systems such as Snort and Bro. These systems
are sensor-based software solutions that monitor network traffic in order to pull out anomalous
behavior and defend against known cyberattacks. Unfortunately zero-day attacks, slow attacks,
and attacks that originate from within are successful at defeating even the best NIDS. Should an
attack successfully make it through the network level the subsequent layer of defense lies within
the host. The next section will discuss defenses that operate within the host level security domain.
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2.2 Host Level Security Domain
In the defense-in-depth paradigm, host level security domain protection falls into the “defending
the computing environment” focus area [29]. This is perhaps one of the hardest domains to protect
because it encompasses all physical, virtual, and social components tied to a host system. This is
such a broad domain that the effects of a successful attack range in cost from inconsequential to
catastrophic.
The physical elements tied to this domain include the hardware of the host system itself and
physical devices controlled by the host. For example, the Easytune 5 software allows users to fine
tune the speed of their CPU fan in order to allow for performance over-clocking. The existence of
this software shows that malware could be written to disable the CPU fan of a computer system
which could result in physical hardware failure due to overheating. In the case of a host that controls
external physical devices the effects could be far more devastating. For example, supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are host machines that control critical infrastructure such
as power generators and water treatment facilities [41]. The compromise of a SCADA system could
have damaging cascading effects.
Virtual elements tied to the host level security domain include critical data, which may contain
intellectual property, and software running on the machine. Blackhat hackers, viruses, worms,
trojans, and malicious insiders threaten all of these elements. An attacker could commit costly
identity theft by compromising critical data such as credit card or social security numbers. Dis-
gruntled employees and other malicious insiders threaten the intellectual property of businesses
which can cost millions of dollars. According to an insider threat study conducted by the National
Threat Assessment Center and CERT Coordination Center, losses from insider threats for several
companies studied were in the tens of millions of dollars each [22]. Malware in the form of viruses,
worms, and trojans attack software in order to destroy systems and facilitate information theft.
The social elements tied to the host level security domain include user computer education, usage
tendencies, and reputations. Uneducated users who download and execute unknown attachments
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sent to them via email create many new attack vectors for outsiders. Educating these users to
safely operate their hosts is as important as running software to detect and remove viruses. In the
earlier example of insider threat versus a business, social elements such as damage to the company’s
reputation are also a risk.
The growing influx of social networking websites has changed the usage tendencies of the average
user. People are instantly connected to their friends and family through technology. Attackers use
this to their advantage to help spread chaos in the form of spam email and malware. Should a
hacker compromise someone’s account on one of these sites, they can propagate malware to everyone
connected to that victim’s social network.
The increased number of attacks combined with the volume of potential attack vectors is over-
whelming. Host level security measures attempt to protect all of these different elements through
education, system integrity verifiers, and antivirus software. Again, in order to properly compare
application level sensors to sensors in other security domains, the following section will focus on the
sensor-based software solutions used to protect this domain, such as host-based intrusion detection
and antivirus software.
2.2.1 System Integrity Verifiers
System integrity verifiers are more commonly referred to as host-based intrusion detection systems
(HIDS). In this section both terms will be used interchangeably. The term “system integrity
verifier” better describes the functionality of this defensive mechanism, while the term “host-based
intrusion detection system” better describes the security domain. These systems monitor changes
to system and log files, the registry, and processes running on the host [14]. They are designed to
work alongside of network intrusion detection systems. While a NIDS protects the communication
channels between different hosts on a network, a HIDS protects the host itself.
System integrity verifiers follow the same three step process described at the beginning of this
chapter. First, data is collected from customized sensors. System integrity verifiers particularly rely
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on data from several different sensors at the same time. For example, one sensor may monitor which
processes are activated, and the length and activity levels of each process. Meanwhile a second
sensor may monitor access logs to files located in the “C:\\Windows\System32” directory. The
fact that these systems collect data from many different sensors is beneficial in that it fully allows
a system integrity verifier the ability to probe the system with seemingly limitless possibilities.
However, it also sheds light onto the complexity of a working host. The combination of multiple
versions of different software and ranging computer skills and security awareness opens up a large
number of potential vulnerabilities. The exorbitant size of the possible attack space is overwhelming,
and determining where to place sensors is challenging.
Next, the collected data is processed. The type of processing depends largely on the collected
data. For example, changes that are made to a system file could use two types of processing. One
type of processing may be checksum verification, while a second type may be to check this access
against anomaly based detection rules. Another example is a sensor that monitors port activity.
Such a sensor could be implemented at either the network or host level. The processing stage for
this may determine when specific ports are properly or improperly accessed [19].
Finally, the third step is to respond to any suspect behavior on the system. Possible responses
are notifying administrators, killing a process, blocking port access, or other actions that protect
against the threat.
Example: A HIDS vs. The Blaster Worm
The Blaster worm is a computer worm that exploits a buffer overflow in the DCOM RPC service on
Windows XP and Windows 2000 machines. It surfaced in late 2003 and spread by spamming itself
to random IP addresses [2]. A system integrity verifier could be used to detect the Blaster worm.
In order to demonstrate this it is important to know how the Blaster worm works. According to
an analysis performed by eEye Digital Security the Blaster worm had the following behavior [10]:
1. Exploit RPC DCOM buffer overflow that binds a system level shell to port 4444 in order to
set up the command channel from the infecting agent and the vulnerable target which is used
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to transmit msblast.exe via TFTP.
2. Create the registry value “HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\
CurrentVersion\Run\windows auto update” with the value “msblast.exe”, which causes the
executable to be automatically run each time the machine boots.
3. Create a mutex named “BILLY” as a way of notifying new instances of Blaster that the target
has already been infected.
4. Initialize Winsock in order to check that the new host has network access.
5. Seek out new hosts by scanning IP addresses.
Knowing the functionality of the Blaster worm makes it easy to see how specific sensors could
easily detect it. A sensor that monitors unauthorized access to ports, particularly port 4444, would
detect this worm. Scanning for changes to the registry or initializations of Winsock would also
detect Blaster. Another host level method for detecting this type of attack would be the antivirus
software approach, which is to seek out a code signature that would match msblast.exe on the disk.
All these sensors could help defend against the Blaster worm.
Example: OSSEC A Host Based Intrusion Detection System
OSSEC is an example of an open source cross platform general purpose host-based intrusion de-
tection system used by internet service providers, governments, universities, and even commercial
companies. It combines log file analysis, file integrity checking, policy monitoring, and rootkit de-
tection to provide real time active response [33]. Its architecture makes use of the three step process
described throughout this chapter. A small client program, called an “agent”, is installed on the
computer to monitor and collect information. These agents are the customized sensors described
in the first stage of the three step process. Next, the information collected from agents is passed
to the “manager”, which is a program residing on the server that centrally performs the second
step, data analysis, for all of the agents connected to the OSSEC server. This is a useful feature
because it provides the ability to perform correlation analysis between agents. From this analysis
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Figure 2.2: Architecture of OSSEC showing the three step process [33]
the system performs the third step by activating a response when something happens. This may
be in the form of blocking an attack or emailing an alert to a system administrator [33]. Figure 2.2
shows the architecture of OSSEC and how it uses the three step process. OSSEC has several other
features, not described here, that assist the general three step process, such as agentless monitoring,
configurable alerting, and virtualization support. Even with all of these features attacks are still
successful. This is the reason defense-in-depth is used. What one level of protection does not catch
the next level should.
2.2.2 Antivirus Software
Antivirus software is a host level security domain protection mechanism that attempts to combat
malicious code and software by scanning the file system for potentially harmful files. Antivirus
software also follows the three step process. The sensor data step is the collection of binary files
to be scanned. The data analysis step is the process of searching the files for code signatures that
are known to be harmful. Should the antivirus software find a match, it fulfills the third step by
taking the appropriate action that matches the threat. In most cases the action is to delete the
bad file and notify the user.
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Antivirus software works by matching code signatures. While signature matching is highly suc-
cessful at detecting specific attacks, it fails to detect to new viruses and polymorphic code, which is
code that mutates through obfuscation. In order to be effective, antivirus software must maintain
an updated signature for each potential threat.
Example: Code Signature Matching and Polymorphic Code
The following example has been crafted to help understand how virus scanners work and why they
can easily detect previously seen code but not new or mutating code. Take the following snippet
of C++ code that loops a compound addition ten times:
Code: C++ Implementation
int a = 3;
for(int i=0;i<10;i++) {
a = a + i;
}
When a program is compiled into an executable, machine readable code is created. The assembly
code for this particular C++ sequence is shown below.
Code: x86 Assembly Representation
.text:0041138E mov [ebp+var 8], 3 // Assign 3 to a variable. In our case ‘a’
.text:00411395 mov [ebp+var 14], 0 // Assign 0 to loop variable ‘i’
.text:0041139C jmp short loc 4113A7 // Jump to first loop condition check.
.text:0041139E mov eax, [ebp+var 14] // Move value of variable ‘i’ into register eax
.text:004113A1 add eax, 1 // Add 1 to register eax
.text:004113A4 mov [ebp+var 14], eax // Move new eax value back into variable ‘i’
.text:004113A7 cmp [ebp+var 14], 0Ah // Loop condition check. Compare ‘i’ to value 10
.text:004113AB jge short loc 4113B8 // If ‘i’ is >= 10, exit loop
.text:004113AD mov eax, [ebp+var 8] // Move value of variable ‘a’ into register eax
.text:004113B0 add eax, [ebp+var 14] // Add value of variable ‘i’ to register eax
.text:004113B3 mov [ebp+var 8], eax // Move new value of eax into variable ‘a’
.text:004113B6 jmp short loc 41139E // Goto next loop iteration
This assembly code can also be translated into a hexadecimal representation of what the computer
actually interprets as seen in the highlighted code below.
Code: Hexadecimal Representation of Assembly
.text:00411380 FF FF B9 36 00 00 00 B8 CC CC CC CC F3 AB C7 45
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.text:00411390 F8 03 00 00 00 C7 45 EC 00 00 00 00 EB 09 8B 45
.text:004113A0 EC 83 C0 01 89 45 EC 83 7D EC 0A 7D 0B 8B 45 F8
.text:004113B0 03 45 EC 89 45 F8 EB E6 33 C0 5F 5E 5B 8B E5 5D
.text:004113C0 C3 CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC
.text:004113D0 CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC
Static pieces of the code, such as instruction opcodes and integer values, and the sequence in
which they occur can be used to construct a specific code signature for this C++ code snippet.
Memory addresses, the registers, and other variable pieces of information can be represented by
don’t care values. The signature will be constructed from the hexadecimal representation where
variable elements are replaced with an ”X” to represent a don’t care value.
Code: Hexadecimal Signature Sequence
"C7 XX XX 03 00 00 00 C7 XX XX 00 00 00 00 EB XX 8B XX XX 83 XX XX 89 XX XX 83 XX XX 0A 7D
XX 8B XX XX 03 XX XX 89 XX XX EB XX"
Now that a signature has been created, this code snippet can be detected by a program that traverses
through an executable looking for a match to this particular byte sequence. This illustrates how a
virus scanner can detect malicious code segments that have previously been encountered and have
signatures. It is also easy to see how malware that has not been seen before will slide past this
method of detection.
If this code were to become mutated through polymorphism or static obfuscation the signature
would not match. For example, the following code example is an assembly representation containing
trivial nop obfuscation.
Code: x86 Assembly Representation with Trivial Obfuscation
.text:0041138E mov [ebp+var 8], 3 // Assign 3 to a variable. In our case ‘a’
.text:00411395 mov [ebp+var 14], 0 // Assign 0 to loop variable ‘i’
.text:0041139C jmp short loc 4113A7 // Jump to first loop condition check.
.text:0041139E mov eax, [ebp+var 14] // Move value of variable ‘i’ into register eax
.text:004113A1 add eax, 1 // Add 1 to register eax
.text:004113A4 mov [ebp+var 14], eax // Move new eax value back into variable ‘i’
.text:004113A7 cmp [ebp+var 14], 0Ah // Loop condition check. Compare ‘i’ to value 10
.text:004113AB jge short loc 4113B8 // If ‘i’ is >= 10, exit loop
.text:004113AD mov eax, [ebp+var 8] // Move value of variable ‘a’ into register eax
.text:004113B0 add eax, [ebp+var 14] // Add value of variable ‘i’ to register eax
.text:004113B3 add eax, 10 // add 10 to register eax
.text:004113B6 sub eax, 10 // sub 10 from register eax
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.text:004113B9 mov [ebp+var 8], eax // Move new value of eax into variable ‘a’
.text:004113Bc jmp short loc 41139E // Goto next loop iteration
In the above code the two inserted instructions cancel each other out and the resulting function-
ality is the same as the original function. These two lines of assembly code however, change the
hexadecimal representation in a way that would not match the original signature.
This is a trivial example that shows the strengths and weaknesses of antivirus detection systems.
In the underground malware black market it is not uncommon for the same pieces of code to
be reused. This means signature-based detection methods should be able to detect the malicious
code. However, malware is becoming increasingly complex due to techniques like polymorphism
and obfuscation. Ten lines of assembly can be dynamically turned into hundreds or thousands of
lines of functionally equivalent code in order to avoid antivirus detection.
2.2.3 Host Level Security Domain Summary
The host level security domain is incredibly far reaching. The dynamic nature of a host system and
the user controlling it creates many opportunities for attacks. Attackers can quickly capitalize on
the vulnerabilities that surface. This makes defending these systems a challenge. System integrity
verifiers attempt to probe a system’s resources to determine if the host is functioning properly.
They do this through a combination of sensor data extracted at the host level and custom analysis.
Antivirus software seeks out malicious code and attempts to block it from harming the system.
Well-designed malware can avoid detection entirely or even disable the antivirus software. The
next section will discuss the application level security domain and measures it takes to detect and
defend against cyberthreats.
2.3 Application Level Security Domain
The application level security domain encompasses defenses that are related to software applications
running on a host machine. It subsumes the methods programmers take to secure the code they
develop. These methods include sensors statically coded into the software, self-defending mecha-
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nisms, and other coding practices resulting in safe applications. This level also extends beyond
the development process into the runtime environment. The runtime environment includes the
virtual memory associated with the application’s process and the state of the application while it
is executing.
Robust application level security is rare due to the nature of the software development cycle.
Programmers are more concerned with getting applications to work than getting them to work
securely. Many times security is pushed aside during the development cycle due to the extra
monetary overhead of verifying a software system. This is one of the reason that seventy-five percent
of vulnerabilities and ultimately hacks come from the application level security domain [27]. There
exists a large gap in the number of vulnerabilities that manifest from application level security and
the number of measures to protect against these vulnerabilities. This section discusses several of
the techniques that can be used to defend the application level security domain. It also introduces
the focus of this thesis, dynamic application level sensors.
2.3.1 Secure Coding Practices
The primary reason vulnerabilities manifest is the lack of secure coding practices. There are
several contributing factors that lead to this shortcoming such as budget, complexity, lack of policy,
ignorance, or simply laziness. Each of these must be overcome in order to develop secure software.
CERT publishes a list of the top ten secure coding practices and recommends following them
during the development cycle to greatly reduce the number of vulnerabilities that arise from an
application [44].
Input validation is the first practice [44]. Validating all input from untrusted sources can
eliminate the majority of software vulnerabilities. These types of vulnerabilities are flaws that result
from “implicit assumptions made by the application developer about the application input [36].”
Buffer overflows are an example of an invalid assumption about the maximum size of an input [36].
In the case of web-based applications, failure to validate input is the reason SQL injection and
cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks are successful. The following is an example of a basic SQL
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Figure 2.3: Example of compiler warning that could lead to unexpected behavior
injection. Assume the application that fails to check inputs is constructing an SQL query string
such as ‘‘SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = ‘" + userName + ‘‘‘;". Should the user input
their name as ‘‘‘a’ OR ’t’=’t‘" the resulting SQL query string would appear to be ‘‘SELECT *
FROM users WHERE name = ’a’ OR ’t’=’t’;" which would return more information than should
be displayed to the individual executing the attack [48]. The same technique can be used to bypass
password authentications on sites that did not validate the input.
Heeding compiler warnings is the second practice that can help reduce the number of software
vulnerabilities [44]. Many developers ignore compiler warnings. Compiling with the highest warning
levels available and fixing the results that the compiler flags can reduce the number of potential
attack vectors. A good example of this is a C or C++ compiler that allows the user to write a
value into a variable that should be a pointer. This forces the pointer to point to some arbitrary
location in memory. Syntactically this may be acceptable but most compilers will throw a warning
for this type of action. Ignoring this type of warning could cause an application to have potentially
unexpected behavior or unanticipated vulnerabilities. For example Figure 2.3 shows the warning
produced for the C++ code ‘‘int *a = 60;" when compiled with gcc at standard warning levels.
Architect and design for security policies is the third secure coding practice that CERT
describes [44]. They suggest creating a software architecture that allows the developer to implement
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and enforce security policies. Moreover, they give the following example: “if your system requires
different privileges at different times, consider dividing the system into distinct intercommunicating
subsystems, each with an appropriate privilege set [44].” In the given example, if one subsystem
were to become compromised the other subsystems would be able to continue operations. In
addition, wherever communication is involved between the sub systems data sanitization should be
implemented.
Keeping designs simple is the fourth secure coding practice [44]. By creating uncomplicated
designs fewer errors surface. More complex designs lead to a larger number of errors that can
be harder to find. Complexity is often unavoidable for functions or applications. For this reason
reducing complexity is relative to how much complexity can be reduced.
Defaulting to deny is the fifth secure coding practice [44]. The idea behind this practice is
to not trust the user. When determining whether or not to allow access to a system, rather than
assuming the user should have access unless they give an indication that they should not, assume
access is not granted unless the user proves they should have access.
Adherence to the principle of least privilege usage is the sixth secure coding practice [44].
Running every application with the smallest amount of privileges required to operate results in
dilution of successful attacks. Attackers who successfully exploit an application with low privileges
are not able to do as much damage as an attacker who exploits an application with system level or
root privileges.
Sanitizing data sent to other systems is the seventh secure coding practice [44]. Sanitizing
data passed to subsystems prevents attacks from potentially invoking unused functionality through
context misunderstandings [44]. In multi-component systems inputs and outputs may be handled
in different ways. In order to ensure the target subsystem functions properly data sanitization
should be handled before input is passed to it.
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Practicing defense in depth strategies is the eighth secure coding practice [44]. If an upper
level defense becomes compromised a lower level defense layer should attempt to defeat attack.
Use effective quality assurance techniques [44]. This is the ninth secure coding practice
and one that is often overlooked. High quality assurance testing can be effective at finding and
neutralizing vulnerabilities before software is deployed for usage. Validation and verification are
a critical stage in the software development cycle that is often overlooked. In complex systems
exhaustive testing may not be feasible. For this a combination of random and end case test vectors
and boundary scanning should be used. Quality testing should take place on different platforms
with common software configurations.
Adopting a secure coding standard is the tenth and final practice published by CERT [44].
Adherence to strict coding standards helps identify abnormalities in code that could potentially
lead to vulnerabilities. An example of this is to consistently verify the success of a dynamic memory
allocation.
These ten coding practices are preventative measures that help fortify code against attackers.
When combined with knowledge of common insecure functions such as strcpy(), which will be
shown to be dangerous in Chapter 6, these methods can greatly reduce the number of vulnera-
bilities in a program. Unfortunately, these methods are only truly effective if followed during the
development cycle. When a vulnerability is discovered after a software system has been deployed,
other defensive measures must be taken into consideration.
Since 2003 Microsoft has released its security updates on the second Tuesday of each month
known as ”Patch Tuesday [35].” Vulnerability patching is the reactive measure software developers
take to fix mistakes they made in the original development of their software and prior patches.
Quickly patching known vulnerabilities is a necessity for securing the application level security
domain.
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2.3.2 Self-Defending Software
Self-defending and self-healing software is code developed to detect, defend, and recover from
attacks. This resilience is most commonly used by host-based intrusion detection systems and
antivirus software. The increasing sophistication of malware has led to malicious code that is
capable of seeking out defensive mechanisms and deactivating or functionally disabling them. This
can be accomplished in several ways, first by attempting to kill a process through a library call to
TerminateProcess, TerminateThread, ExitProcess, or SuspendThread [24]. Another way is to
inject code into the process of the antivirus application that modifies the logical functionality of
the program at run time. This is potentially a way of functionally disabling the antivirus software
even though it is still technically running. In a 2004 study that tested the ability of several common
antivirus packages’ to recover from attack attempts, Kaspersky labs’ antivirus software was the only
one capable of surviving attacks launched even with administrator privileges. Several other antiviral
applications were easily defeated and others had mixed results. With local administrator privileges
F-Secure and Pestpatrol were deactivated, while Panda and Trend Micro’s antivirus protection was
automatically restarted after 30 seconds. Grisoft and Symantec continued functioning though their
processes were killed [45]. This study shows that several of the tested antivirus software packages
are capable of self-defense.
This kind of defense is ideal not only for antivirus software but also for general purpose application
development. This will require sensors that actively seek vulnerabilities and attacks in progress, in
an effort to automatically fix and recover from them. It is unrealistic to expect a host level security
system to perform this sort of fine grain monitoring on all the different applications running on a
system. For that reason, these sensors need to be built into the applications themselves or added
dynamically at runtime.
2.3.3 Static Application Level Sensors
Static application level sensors are coded into the program during the development cycle. They
report information related to functional operation of the application at runtime. For example,
23
web applications deployed in Apache often report information pertaining to database connections,
access attempts, and other functionality. The problem with these static application level sensors
is they often are being used improperly. Most of the reports created from these application level
events are used only for debug purposes and the logs created are never examined unless absolutely
necessary. If an attacker is attempting a brute force password attack on an Apache web application
sensors could easily be developed into the system to detect this. More application level sensors
need to be implemented during the development cycle. Also the three step process that is seen at
the other security level domains needs to be implemented. Rather than simply logging these events
to a file, the application should run automatic analysis to discover any inconsistencies in expected
execution as it runs. The result of this analysis could then trigger a response, possibly in the form
of a code sequence that immediately neutralizes a suspected attack in progress.
2.3.4 Dynamic Application Level Sensors
Many applications running on a computer system do not readily have their source code available
to add static event sensors. This is the case with common proprietary applications, such as the
Microsoft Office suite or with legacy applications in which source code is no longer available. The
work presented in this thesis proposes a solution to this problem that is based on the combination of
reverse engineering and dynamic-link library (DLL) code injection, which will be discussed further
in Chapter 3. The basic idea is to create an execution thread inside an application’s process
that dynamically deploys customized sensors. The locations of these sensors are found by reverse
engineering the application and discerning where critical data and functions reside in the virtual
memory space. After these sensors are deployed analysis is run on the data they produce to develop
active responses to potential threats. It is understandable why reverse engineering is required for
legacy software but in the case of proprietary software these type of defenses should be built into
the application. If the vendor fails to do this they should at least provide the proper hooks to add
them dynamically.
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2.3.5 Application Level Security Domain Summary
The majority of software vulnerabilities manifest within the application level security domain. Yet
it is this domain that is the least protected. Most of the defenses in this domain are focused on
avoiding common coding mistakes that lead to vulnerabilities. The combined knowledge of common
exploits with a secure coding practice can greatly reduce the number of problems in a program.
However this is not a total solution because as the complexity of architectures increases unexpected
behavior can emerge. The next application level defensive measure deals with developing patches
in a timely manner for code that is known to be vulnerable. Major software companies have been
doing this for many years. “Patch Tuesday,” the second Tuesday of each month, has become the
official exploit correction day for Microsoft. Unfortunately, counting on developers to not make
mistakes and simply fixing them when they do is the reason attackers always have the upper hand.
Attackers show developers what needs to be patched by exploiting the vulnerabilities prevalent in
the software. The problem is that the damage done in the initial attack can be costly.
New application level defensive mechanisms need to further explore the concept of self-healing
code. Code that can recover from an attack is impressive in of itself but extending that capability
to develop code that can monitor its own health and deploy dynamic defenses depending on the
results of that health monitor would be a significant technical advancement. This capability could
be accomplished through application level sensors. The functionality could be built into new
programs and dynamically added to existing programs at run time.
2.4 Conclusions
There are many existing techniques for defending the many security domains. When combined these
form the standard defense in depth idea of cybersecurity. The strongest defenses follow the three
step process described throughout this chapter. Step one is to acquire data through a customized
sensor. Step two is to analyze that data, and step three is to respond to any threats that the
analysis has detected.
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At the network level security domain the three step process is seen in many of the network
based intrusion detection systems. The sensors collect packet information that is then passed on to
signature and anomaly based analysis systems. From there the potential problems are filtered out
and administrators are notified. Should defenses at this level fail the subsequent layer of defense is
the host level security domain.
The host level has many different software based solutions for protecting a workstation, such as
host based intrusion detection systems and antivirus software. Each of these methods follows the
three step process: collect, analyze and respond. In the case of the host based intrusion detection
system, sensors come from many different sources such as process analytics, file system monitors,
and many other locations.
The next level of system defense is the application level where the three step process is not well
implemented. Developers are given the responsibility to not make mistakes in their code that could
lead to problems. If a mistake is made it is patched after deployment. The defensive measures are
centered more around coding properly the first time and less on detecting problems as or before
they are exploited. One possible solution is static and dynamic application level sensors. The
advent of multiprocessor systems opens the door for processor cores that are dedicated to securing
the applications running on a system. Threads of execution can be spawned inside the virtual
memory space of processes running on the system in order to perform security analysis. The next
two chapters will explore the required technologies to efficiently implement dynamic application
level sensors.
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Chapter 3
Dynamic-Link Library Code Injection
Dynamic-link library injection is the sequence of steps taken to forcibly load code contained in a
DLL into the virtual memory space of another process. Attackers have been using this technique
for many years to execute malicious code without detection. For that reason code injection has
acquired negative connotations. However, this same technique can be used defensively to develop
dynamic application level security sensors. Chapter 3 discusses the different types of code injection
and particularly details DLL injection.
3.1 Types of Code Injection
Code injection comes in several forms such as SQL, XSS, and DLL injection. Each of these methods
will be explained further, but the form this thesis will focus on is DLL injection. Understanding
the similarities and differences of other injection methods is important to the understanding of how
DLL injection is a unique class of code injection and how it can be used defensively.
3.1.1 SQL Injection
SQL injection is a form of injection intent on attacking databases. Attacks can result from the
failure to validate user input. Attackers use SQL injection in an attempt to insert, delete, modify,
or extract data. In 2004, this type of attack was used to collect 40 million credit card numbers
from a CardSystems, Inc database [32].
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Figure 3.1: Type of errors used in a full-view SQL injection attack
In general there are two common types of SQL injection attacks: full-view attacks and blind
attacks. Full-view attacks probe the system with inputs and look at the error messages reported to
determine how to formulate their attack. Figure 3.1 shows an example of the kind of output used
in full-view attacks. Blind SQL injection attacks are used when web applications are developed
in such a way that prevents error messages from being displayed. Table names and contents are
not known in these types of attacks, therefore a blind SQL attack probes the system with boolean
queries to extract information one character at a time [32]. An example of an SQL injection attack
can be found in the discussion of input validation in Chapter 2 on page 17.
SQL injection attacks are fairly noisy and easy to detect. Many times, defending against them
is as easy as input validating. In other cases, parsing web server log files or building signatures for
NIDS or HIDS can defend against these types of attacks.
3.1.2 Cross-Site Scripting Injection
Cross-site scripting injection attacks are another variant of code injection that relies on a web
application’s failure to validate user input. Eighty-four percent of the web-based vulnerabilities
documented by Symantec during the last six months of 2007 were cross-site scripting vulnerabilities
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[52]. The intended targets of these attacks are the users who visit a website after the attack has
occurred. XSS attacks are successful due to the nature of web browsers. When a user accesses a
webpage, the HTML code is downloaded and interpreted by the web browser. Scripting languages
can be embedded into the website’s markup language in several ways, such as <script> tags and
attributes such as, style or src. On webpages that store and display user input such as blogs,
auctions, or comment sections, attackers can input <script> tags with malicious script code. If
the site fails to validate the attacker’s input, other users that view the site later download the
HTML with these <script> tags containing malicious code.
XSS attacks are difficult to protect against for several reasons. First, neither encryption nor
firewalls can protect against them. Second, there are many ways to trick browsers into executing
the malicious code, and third, these attacks are easily disguised [53].
Example: Cross-Site Scripting
The following example is of a basic XSS injection. An HTML page prompts the user to input their
name. When the user presses submit, it sends the value of name to a PHP script that generates
a custom welcome page with the user’s name. The file “input.html” is the markup for the initial
page that prompts the user for their name.
Code: input.html
<html>
<body>
Please Enter Your Name.
<form name=“input” method=“post” action=“name.php”>
<p>Name: <input type=“textbox” name=“name” size=“70”/></p>
<p><input type=“submit” value=“Submit” /></p>
</form>
</body>
</html>
The following code segment shows a valid input string that would result in a basic cross-site scripting
attack.
Code: input string
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<p onmouseover=javascript:alert(911) > Christopher T. Rathgeb </p>
When the user hits submit on the webpage, the input string is sent to “name.php” which embeds
the user input into the customized page.
CODE: name.php
<?php
echo “ <html> <body>”;
echo “Welcome: ”. $ POST[’name’];
echo “</body> </html>”;
?>
The markup for the page that “name.php” generates is seen below. The embedded javascript can
be seen inside it. When the user moves their mouse over the name a popup window is thrown to
the screen.
Code: generated HTML page
<html>
<body>
Welcome:
<p onmouseover=javascript:alert(911)> Christopher T. Rathgeb </p>
</body>
</html>
This sequence of events can be seen in Figure 3.2.
3.1.3 DLL Injection
The SQL and XSS injection methods are both targeted towards web-based applications. DLL
injection differs in that it targets the processes of applications running on a system. It forces the
execution of precompiled code inside the virtual memory space of another application’s process.
This process is accomplished using multi-threading.
Threads are alternate execution streams that run concurrently or pseudo-concurrently with their
parent process. Whether or not the execution streams are concurrent or pseudo-concurrent de-
pends on factors such as, the processor, operating system, and thread model. Essentially they
are lightweight processes that share state, memory address space, and other resources within their
parent process. Multi-core processors offer concurrency by tasking each core with different threads
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Figure 3.2: Cross-site scripting injection example
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Figure 3.3: Thread level concurrency on single and multi-core processors
of execution. On the other hand, single-core processors offer pseudo-concurrency by multiplexing
the processor between execution streams. This concept can be seen in Figure 3.3.
Threads are the ideal construct for DLL code injection, because after the code of a DLL is loaded
into the memory of the target process, a thread can be spawned within the host process. This allows
the code to execute. Later in this chapter several methods of this technique will be detailed.
Example: Injecting “Hello World!” into Internet Explorer
In the following example, helloworld.dll is injected into iexplore.exe. This results in the DLL simply
displaying a message box that says ”Hello World!” The code for helloworld.dll can be seen below.
CODE: helloworld.cpp
bool APIENTRY DllMain(HMODULE hModule,DWORD ul reason for call, LPVOID lpReserved){
MessageBoxA(NULL,“Hello World!”,“Hello World!”,MB OK);
return true;
}
Figure 3.4 is a screenshot of the output when injected into an active instance of iexplore.exe.
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Figure 3.4: Result of helloworld.dll being injected into iexplore.exe
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3.1.4 Summary of Types of Code Injection
Understanding the basics of other forms of code injection is crucial to understanding DLL injection,
which is the method used in this thesis. SQL injection attacks exploit databases through user input
that has not been validated. This method can be used to insert, delete, modify, or extract data from
databases. XSS injection exploits user input to embed malicious scripts inside the HTML markup
downloaded by the user when the view a webpage. Finally, dynamic link library injection targets
the processes of applications running on a computer system. It forces the execution of precompiled
code within the virtual memory space of the host process. The next section will discuss several of
the techniques used for implementing DLL injection.
3.2 DLL Injection Techniques
There are many methods of DLL injection such as Windows APIs, Windows hooks, code caves, and
reflective injection [8] [7]. Of these methods, the two most common techniques are Windows APIs
and Windows Hooks. This section will provide a general overview of these two methods. More
detail and source code implementations of these methods can readily be found on the internet.
As stated in the introduction these methods assume some form of execution is already on the
system. In the case of malware the execution is usually accomplished through email attachments,
Trojan horses, or some sort of vulnerability such as a buffer overflow. In the defensive mechanisms
presented in this work, execution can be manually initiated.
3.2.1 Windows APIs
DLL injection can be achieved through the correct combination of Microsoft Windows APIs. The
WinSpy project on www.codeproject.com provides the following sequence of API calls to inject a
DLL into a target process [25]. This information is common knowledge and used by many “script
kiddies” to perform DLL code injection.
1. Retrieve a HANDLE to the remote process (OpenProcess) [25].
2. Allocate memory for the DLL name in the remote process (VirtualAllocEx) [25].
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3. Write the DLL name, including full path, to the allocated memory (WriteProcessMemory)
[25].
4. Map the DLL to the remote process via CreateRemoteThread and LoadLibrary [25].
5. Wait until the remote thread terminates (WaitForSingleObject); this is until the call to
LoadLibrary returns. Put another way, the thread will terminate as soon as DllMain (called
with reason DLL PROCESS ATTACH) returns [25].
6. Retrieve the exit code of the remote thread (GetExitCodeThread). Note that this is the value
returned by LoadLibrary, thus the base address (HMODULE) of our mapped DLL [25].
7. Free the memory allocated in Step #2 (VirtualFreeEx) [25].
8. Unload the DLL from the remote process via CreateRemoteThread and FreeLibrary. Pass
the HMODULE handle retreived in Step #6 to FreeLibrary (via lpParameter in CreateRemoteThread)
[25].
9. Wait until the thread terminates (WaitForSingleObject) [25].
3.2.2 Windows Hooks
The next technique commonly used to perform DLL injection is the Windows hooks method. This
method works through the SetWindowsHookEx() function. This function hooks Windows messages
for local and remote processes. A hook is another word for a detour, which will be described
in detail in Chapter 4. Hooks are a way of triggering code segments to be executed whenever a
function or message is called. The injected DLL has a filter function that is added to a linked list
of existing hooks. When the Windows message is triggered, this list is traversed and the provided
functions are executed. Therefore, the DLL injection is handled implicitly through the hooks [16].
3.2.3 Summary of DLL Injection Techniques
The Windows APIs and Windows hooks techniques are two of the most commonly used DLL
injection methods. This section examined the general procedure taken by these two methods. The
35
next section will discuss techniques used to detect DLL injection.
3.3 Detecting DLL Injection
Detecting a DLL injection depends on two factors, the method of code injection and the measures
the programmer went to in order to avoid detection.
The first factor depends on the method through which the code has been injected. Certain
methods are more detectable then others. For example, the Windows API injection method is
easily detected in several ways. It explicitly calls LoadLibrary(). A functional hook placed on this
API call could be used to catch this method. A second method uses the Windows Process API,
which provides the functionality to enumerate loaded modules for a given process. The enumerated
list can be scanned for injected DLLs [42]. For each of these methods of detection, a countermeasure
exists to avoid detection.
For this reason, the second factor of detecting DLL injection depends in part on the programmer’s
determination to avoid detection. In the example of the enumerated module list, the injected library
can remove itself from the enumeration lists. Many DLL injection techniques are detected by file
scanners and antivirus software because of their hard disk activity. These detection methods can be
evaded by loading dynamic-link libraries directly from memory without disk interaction. Reflective
DLL injection is an example of a technique that accesses the disk making it harder to detect [8].
The research presented in this thesis does not implement any of the anti-detection mechanisms
described in this section. However, stealthy execution is possible if it is required.
3.4 Existing Applications of DLL Injection
DLL injection, like other forms of code injection, generally has a negative connotation. These
negative connotations stem from its association with malicious software. DLL injection allows the
user to force the execution of their code inside another process with that processes’ access privileges.
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Once inside the process, it shares the state, memory address space, and resources with the host
process. Many viruses and worms have used this technique to execute code without detection.
While there are many ways this technique can be used improperly, there are several legitimate
usages as well.
3.4.1 Malware
There are many features of DLL injection that make it attractive to malware such as viruses
and worms. First, this form of code injection is relatively easy to use. “Script kiddies” can
perform an Internet search and obtain working code for different methods of injection. Second, as
described in the previous section, the ability to avoid detection methods allow for stealthy execution.
Stealth is one of the most attractive features of DLL injection to malware. In general, the longer
malware lives undetected the more damage it does. Third, while some methods are more publicly
known than others, there are many different techniques for process injection. This is beneficial to
malware because varying injection methods can help avoid detection by code signature. Fourth,
the nature of threads grants malware access to the memory of the host process. This access can
be used to steal information or modify the logical flow of the application. Fifth, when malware is
successfully operational within a process, it assumes the access privileges of that process. Should
a piece of malware find its way into a system or administrator-owned process, it can effectively
perform operations at that access level. Finally, malware can mask its functionality and hide from
network and host-based intrusion detection systems by cleverly attaching to the right processes.
For example, some forms of malware attempt to connect to a central server. If malware attempts
to connect through notepad, it could raise suspicion. However, if it uses a web browser to connect,
it is more likely that an intrusion detection systems would perceive this as normal activity [6].
Example: Thread Bomb
The thread bomb attack is a relatively harmless piece of malware created for the purpose of this
example. This attack injects into a process and spawns off the maximum number of threads allowed.
Each created thread enters an infinite loop, which quickly exhausts the computer’s resources. The
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following is the code that does this.
CODE: threadbomb.cpp
#include <windows.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#define MAX THREADS 8192
#define HALF SECOND 500
void ThreadBomb();
bool APIENTRY DllMain(HMODULE hModule,DWORD ul reason for call, LPVOID lpReserved) {
for(int i=0;i<MAX THREADS;i++)
CreateThread(0,0,(LPTHREAD START ROUTINE)ThreadBomb,0,0,NULL);
while(1) {}
}
void ThreadBomb() {
while (1) {
Sleep(HALF SECOND);
}
ExitThread(0);
}
The results can be seen in Figure 3.5. The thread bomb does no real harm to the system but
illustrates how easy it is to create malware with process injection. This type of attack can quickly
disable a system and require a reboot. If code were added to this attack to automatically run upon
reboot the thread bomb could become much more malicious.
Example: The Storm Worm
The Storm computer worm surfaced in early 2007 and targeted computers running variants of
Microsoft Windows. It creates a peer-to-peer distributed botnet capable of lunching DDoS, spam,
and phishing attacks. The fact that the Storm worm is peer-to-peer and not centralized makes it
difficult to destroy [49].
In March of 2008, Offensive Computing, LLC. performed a malware analysis on a variant of the
Storm worm. The particular strand of the worm loads a driver into the kernel which injects the
Storm worm into services.exe. The worm begins by enumerating the process list to determine the
id of services.exe. Next, the payload of the worm is decrypted with a simple XOR cipher. After that
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Figure 3.5: Effect of a thread bomb in action
the worm attaches to the process space and allocates memory through the KeAttachProcess and
ZwOpenProcess functions. The code is then inserted into the running process [38]. In the case of
the Storm worm, the inserted code is in executable form not DLL form; however, the end result is
the same.
3.4.2 Functionality Additions
Thus far code injection has been discussed in terms of malware. However, not all code injection
is malicious. DLL injection can be used to add functionality to software systems in which source
code is not available. Such systems may include legacy code, lost code, or proprietary applications.
For example, Company X has a custom software system they use to do statistical analysis on client
data. One day they decide they want the output of their statistical analysis to be web accessible,
but they do not have the source code to the software system anymore. DLL injection allows them to
insert the necessary functionality. If they were to inject a DLL into the process that harvested the
output of the statistical model and put it into an SQL database they could write a web application
that displays the data through SQL queries.
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Figure 3.6: Extended functionality of Task Manager [40]
Example: Extending Task Manager
In the TaskEx project on www.codeproject.com, DLL injection is used to extend the functionality
of the Windows Task Manager. First, an application sits in the background waiting for instances
of task manager to popup. When an instance is discovered, it injects a DLL that installs an extra
menu named “Extensions” to the application’s main menu. From here additional information can
be obtained about particular processes [40]. A picture of the extended functionality addition can
be seen in Figure 3.6.
Example: MMORelay
MMORelay is a software system that I developed in 2008 to add functionality to massive multiplayer
online role playing games. MMORelay is an application the user runs that connects to the video
game and relays the chat functionality of to a web interface. This web interface can be accessed
and interacted with from any web browser around the world. The end result is the added ability
of a user to chat with their virtual video game friends without being at their computer.
The system adds the relay functionality to the game through DLL injection. The injected code
detects output to the chat window of the game and sends it off to the web server. The web server
queues the messages in a database. When the user connects to the website he or she pulls the
messages from the database and can actively respond to them remotely. The response is sent back
to the person’s computer and ultimately put into the game.
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Figure 3.7: MMORelay’s chat functionality addition through DLL injection
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3.4.3 Summary of Existing Applications of DLL Injection
Dynamic-link library injection is a powerful method that can be used by software with both ma-
licious and legitimate intent. Malware uses this method because it provides a simple, robust, and
stealthy way of executing malicious code within the addresses space of another process. This allows
the malware to assume the privileges of the host process and hide from intrusion detection systems.
On the other hand, DLL injection can also be used legitimately to extend the functionality of soft-
ware that has no source code available. MMORelay is an example of a software system that uses
DLL injection to extend the functionality of a video game. It provides web-based interoperability
to the chat features of the game. Another example of a legitimate use of DLL injection is the func-
tional extensions added to task manager, which can be seen in Figure 3.6 [40]. The next section
discusses dynamic application level sensors as a new application of DLL injection application.
3.5 Dynamic Application Level Sensors Through DLL Injection
Dynamic application level sensors can be implemented through DLL injection. The same legitimate
methods used to add functionality to applications can be used to add dynamic sensors to appli-
cations. These sensors have a unique advantage over host level security domain defenses. They
execute within a thread of the application, which gives them access to the application’s state, vir-
tual memory, and resources. This information can be extracted by the injected DLL and used to
help secure the system against external and internal threats.
3.5.1 External Threats
External threats are constantly probing computer systems looking for any sign of weakness. Dy-
namic application level sensors are uniquely positioned to defend against these threats. For example,
a sensor could be setup to collect data on the normal executional flow of a program. This data
could then be used to build a profile for the program logic flow. Should the program deviate from
this executional flow, such as a buffer overflow exploit used to install malicious shell code, the
sensor data returned would reflect this abnormality and the system performing analysis would see
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the deviation. Another example is a sensor that detects potential buffer overflow, memory leaks,
or arithmetic overflow and dynamically patches them. For example, a sensor reports to the anal-
ysis station that an unsafe strcpy() is being executed. The response mechanism then deploys a
functional detour that replaces the unsafe function with a safe version.
3.5.2 Internal Threats
As discussed in Chapter 2, the insider threat problem costs businesses tens of millions of dollars
each year [22]. Dynamic application level sensors could help protect against malicious insiders.
The state information of applications and usage patterns of insiders can be monitored at run time,
through DLL injected sensors, to profile normal usage. Should a malicious insider begin acting
outside these normal patterns, the application level anomaly detection system built from dynamic
application level sensors would detect it. The example sensor presented in Chapters 5 is targeted
at malicious insiders.
3.5.3 Summary of Dynamic Application Level Sensors Through DLL Injection
DLL injection provides the required constructs to implement dynamic application level sensors.
These sensors can be used to probe an application in ways that were previously not possible. Ap-
plication level security domain defenses can be built to protect against threats to the network and
computer system, both external and internal. Chapters 5 and 6 will explore example implementa-
tions of dynamic application level sensors.
3.6 Conclusions
There are several types of code injection that can be used in malicious ways, such as SQL, XSS,
and DLL injection. However, DLL injection can also be used legitimately to add dynamic sensors.
The idea behind DLL injection is to force a thread of execution inside a targeted host process. This
thread has access to the state, virtual memory, and resources of its parent process and therefore has
a unique opportunity to collect fine grain data and process it for defensive security applications.
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The next chapter will discuss the sequence of steps taken to develop one of these custom application
level sensors.
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Chapter 4
Developing Dynamic Sensors
Dynamic application level sensors extract critical information from processes at run time. Develop-
ing these sensors is a multi-stage process. The first stage is to determine the extractable data. This
primarily depends on two factors, the security threat and target application. The second stage
is to reverse engineer the target application. This stage is a challenging feedback loop of static
and dynamic binary analysis. The goal is to extract memory locations for critical data elements
and functions that can be logically detoured. The third stage uses the extracted memory locations
discovered in the reverse engineering stage to automate the data extraction in the form of a DLL
that is injected into the application. Finally, the fourth stage is to analyze the data and respond
to any threats. This chapter will describe each step of this multi-stage process; however, it will
concentrate primarily on the first three stages. This is due to the fact that the focus of this thesis
is not on the analysis and response but rather the sensor elements.
4.1 Determine the Extractable Data
Identifying what type of data is collectable is the first stage of developing dynamic application level
sensors. This directs the reverse engineering stage. In order to effectively begin reverse engineering,
the programmer needs to know what valuable information to seek. Determining the type of data
to collect primarily depends on two factors: the security threat and targeted application.
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4.1.1 The Security Threat
The first factor that influences what type of data to collect is the security threat. For example,
the type of data needed to defend against insider threat differs from the type of data required to
defend against malware.
An insider threat detection sensor could collect information pertaining to a user’s usage tendencies
for a particular application, such as all possible user input for an application. The input could
be then used to model how the user typically interacts with that particular application. In the
analysis stage an anomaly detection algorithm could profile the users’s normal behavior within the
application, and then respond to any behavior that is abnormal. Chapter 5 creates the sensor
portion of this defense on the application putty.exe, which is a client SSH program.
A malware detection sensor could extract runtime information on the binary execution of soft-
ware functions that are known to be malware free. Statistical analysis could provide a threshold
for expected runtimes of these functions. Should a form of malware attempt to nullify or inject
malicious code into one of these code segment, the sensor would report timings outside of accept-
able mathematic standard deviations. Additionally, this type of defense would be able to protect
against polymorphic code, because polymorphism tends to increase the size of the malware code.
This is done in an attempt to obfuscate the true functionality from signature matching methods
and reverse engineering. The increased size of the malware code would result in longer timing
analysis making it appear even more abnormal. This sensor has been created and is detailed in
Chapter 6.
The first factor to developing dynamic sensors that can potentially detect these security threats
is determining what to collect. Deciding which application the sensor will collect data from is the
next factor that needs to be considered.
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4.1.2 The Application
Ascertaining which applications to develop sensors for is the next factor in determining what data
to collect. Selecting the application has several dependencies, such as how specific the sensor is to
the application, what applications are available to run, and the language in which the application
was originally coded.
The first dependency is how specific the sensor is to the application. If a sensor is highly specific
to a particular application then the application must fit the sensor’s requirements. For example,
a sensor could be developed to collect information on the keywords or phrases entered into an
internet search. Text analysis could then be run on the keywords for phrases such as “how to build
a bomb” or “how to plant a computer virus.” The requirements for such an application are that
the application must be able to perform Internet searches. The most likely choice of application
would be a web browser, however any program that has a iframe embedded into it also meets this
specific constraint. Some programs embed dynamic advertisements inside iframes of applications.
Generic sensors can be applied to any application that fits a set of constraints. For example,
a constraint may be that the application must render graphics to the screen using Microsoft’s
DirectX. This is could be the case for games or other graphic intensive applications. A sensor that
could have this particular constraint would be one that collects data about what is being drawn to
the screen through the render function of DirectX.
The second dependency of the choice of application to collect data from is the set of available
applications, particularly the subset of applications that run regularly. This subset may change
depending on the users of a system. For example, an accountant is more likely to use a program
like Quicken then a computer programmer. It may be of particular interest to the employer of this
accountant to install application level sensors that monitor the accountant’s usage of this program.
For this reason, the company could develop a sensor that canonically captures and logs all possible
user input to Quicken. The sensor not only captures the inputs but also the biometric timing
data of the inputs. An anomaly detection algorithm, then processes the extracted data and builds
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a standard usage baseline for the accountant’s interactions with Quicken. This baseline includes
what operations the accountant normally executes within the program, the standard transitions
from one action to the next, and the biometric timings related to those transitions. If the accountant
leaves his desk to go to lunch and forgets to lock his door, the company does not need to worry
about disgruntled coworkers attempting to modify the books to steal money. The application level
sensor captures, logs, and processes all of the interactions to Quicken. A properly trained anomaly
detection system would be able to tell that the accountant was not the individual using Quicken
during the lunch break. There would also be a log file showing the sequence of events inside the
program.
The final dependency on the choice of application for which to develop sensors is the language
that the application was originally coded. As stated in the introduction, the work presented in this
thesis makes several assumptions. These assumptions include that the applications these sensors
are dynamically added to run on Microsoft Windows and are programmed in a language that can
be disassembled into x86 assembly, such as C or C++.
4.1.3 Summary of Determining the Extractable Data
Determining the type of data that is collectable helps pinpoint what to look for in the reverse
engineering stage. There are two main factors that help decide what type of data to collect. The
first factor is the type of security threat. The data collected for insider threat detection is different
than the data collected for malware detection. The second factor is choosing which application
to attempt to collect data from. This decision is dependant on how specific the sensor is to the
application, the subset of applications that are run on the system, and the language in which the
application was coded. Once the application and type of data are determined, the next step is to
reverse engineer the binary to extract the critical data and functions. This stage will be discussed
in the next section.
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4.2 Reverse Engineer the Application
Reverse engineering is the second stage of the multistage process. It is the sequence of steps taken
to break down an application to machine readable code for static and dynamic analysis. The goal
is to extract critical memory locations for function detours and data. Much like code injection, the
term “reverse engineering” has acquired a negative connotation. This is due to the existing motives
of many individuals who reverse engineer software. Such motives include, finding vulnerabilities in
code in order to developing malware, analyzing existing malware in order to build a defense, and
commercially gaining a competitive advantage by learning the “trade secrets” of a competitor.
However, reverse engineering principles can be used constructively in order to dynamically add
defensive sensors to applications. Much like analyzing existing malware, the intention is beneficial
to the computer owner. As discussed in earlier chapters, the types of software that require reverse
engineering are those for which source code is not available, such as proprietary, legacy, or lost code.
In cases where code is available, such as open source or in-house programs, reverse engineering is
not required as the sensors can be compiled directly into the application.
In the case of legacy or lost code, reverse engineering is a necessary measure. However, in the
case of proprietary software, cooperative reverse engineering should not be necessary. Companies
should either provide the source code to their products or guarantee the security of their code.
At the very least they should provide the proper hooks for adding security dynamically after the
software has been deployed. Unfortunately, due to the nature of business and lack of policy to
govern proprietary software security requirements, proprietary software must be reversed as well.
The goal of the reverse engineering stage is to extract memory locations for critical data elements
and functions that can be hooked. This section will focus on the reverse engineering process, and
detail the tools and methods used to extract the required data for the security sensor.
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Figure 4.1: Reverse engineering feedback loop
4.2.1 The Reverse Engineering Process
The reverse engineering process is a challenging feedback loop of static and dynamic binary analysis,
critical data extraction, sensor design, and process injection. Static analysis is the process of
disassembling the application into machine code and studying it while it is in a not running sate. On
the other hand, dynamic analysis studies the application while it is in a running state. Breakpoints
are inserted and the dynamic state of the registers, the stack, and programmatic flow are studied.
From this static and dynamic analysis data is extracted and a sensor designed. The reason the
reverse engineering process is a feedback system is that often finding the targeted information is
not trivial. Intermediate step sensors are developed to provide more information and gain further
insight to the functionality of the program. These intermediate step sensors are injected into the
application to assist in finding the targeted information in future dynamic analysis steps. This
reverse engineering feedback loop ends when the targeted information is discovered. This feedback
loop can be seen in Figure 4.1.
4.2.2 Reverse Engineering Tools
As with any job, having the right set of tools can make the task easier. For reverse engineering, the
proper set of tools should consist of a dissembler, a hex editor, a jump calculator, and a compiler.
The following is the set of tools used to perform the work presented in this thesis.
1. IDA Pro is an interactive disassembler and debugger. It supports over 50 processor families
and allows the user to analyze the assembly code of an application both statically and dy-
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namically. When used dynamically, it runs the application in debug mode, which allows the
user to add breakpoints and step through the program’s assembly code line-by-line. At each
step, dynamic information, such as the state of the registers and stack, can be analyzed [17].
2. Winhack 2.0 is a traditional memory editor. It displays the virtual memory for each process
and allows modification at run time.
3. Cheat Engine is a more sophisticated memory editor. It has additional functionality to
iteratively scan memory for specific values, freeze memory locations from value changes,
snoop code that access specific memory locations, and find references to pointers. The full
functionality of Cheat Engine is not limited to the described capabilities and can be found
online [5].
4. JumpCalc is a program used to calculate the hexadecimal representation of a modified branch
instruction for the x86 instruction set architecture. This is useful when changing the condi-
tions of a branch. For example, turning a conditional jump, such as JNE, to an unconditional
jump, such as JMP, changes the hexadecimal representation. This will be discussed in further
detail in the next subsection.
5. Visual Studio 2008 is a compiler. It is used to develop the intermediate step sensors and
ultimately the final sensor.
Screenshots of each of these tools in action can be found in Appendix A. The next section will focus
on several of the methods used while reverse engineering an application.
4.2.3 Reverse Engineering Methods
The dynamic binary analysis portion of the reverse engineering feedback loop is where knowledge
of the code layout meets line-by-line execution. It allows the reverse engineer to study the state
of the application at a given instance of its execution. However, the dynamic analysis section is
not limited to running in debug mode. The combination of other methods can prove to be quite
helpful. Function detouring, logic path alterations, iterative memory scanning, and the outputs
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Figure 4.2: Pictorial example of detours
from previous intermediate step sensors can all be used to help extract the critical data required
of the reverse engineering.
Function detouring, also known as a wedge or a hook, is the first method that can help extract
critical data. It is the process of “intercepting arbitrary Win32 functions on x86 machines [15].”
Detours work by replacing the first few instructions of the targeted function with unconditional
jumps to a detour function. The original function is saved in a “trampoline.” After the dynamically
added detour function is finished, the trampoline is used to resume execution as normal [15]. Mi-
crosoft research presented this concept and library in the Proceedings of the 3rd USENIX Windows
NT Symposium in 1999. They claimed that the typical reasons to intercept functions is to add
functionality, modify returned results or insert instrumentation for debugging or performance pro-
filing [15]. This work proposes a new reason, which is to use function detours to insert application
level cybersecurity sensors. Figure 4.2 shows a pictorial representation of function detours.
Logic path alterations can be used to help extract critical data. They are subtle modifications to
the application’s code at runtime that force a branch one direction or another. Logic path alterations
are ideal for determining the functionality of assembly functions. For example, a reverse engineer
observes the behavior of a function and decides to replace a conditional jump, such as JNZ, with
an unconditional jump, such as JMP. The reverse engineer does this in order to observe the new
behavior of the function within the application. This task can be accomplished with the JumpCalc
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Figure 4.3: Logic path alteration example
tool. This tool calculates the hexadecimal representation of the new assembly instruction JMP. Then
the reverse engineer uses a memory edito,r such as WinHack 2.0, to change the memory location
of the JNZ instruction to the calculated hexadecimal representation of the new instruction. After
this logical path alteration, the branch is always taken. This can be seen in Figure 4.3.
Iterative memory scanning is the process of scanning memory for some criteria. After the results
are returned, the search is refined and performed again on the returned result set from the previous
search. This process is continued until the location of the targeted data is pinpointed. The tool
Cheat Engine provides this functionality. This is particularly useful for finding the memory location
of data that can be manipulated in the original program. For example, as the user punches text
into Notepad++, the text is stored into memory. Iterative memory scanning could be used to
pinpoint the start of this storage. Figure 4.4 shows this process.
4.2.4 Summary of Reverse Engineering the Application
The process of reverse engineering is a feedback loop. Multiple passes through the loop allow for
different static and dynamic analysis. Methods such as function detouring, logic path alterations,
and iterative memory scanning can be used to help understand the full functionality of an applica-
tion. This understanding allows for the extraction of the targeted types of critical data. The goal
of reverse engineering is to find the memory address of important functions and data constructs
within the application. The next step is to develop the sensor into a DLL that can be injected. The
DLL applies detours to the important functions to act as a checkpoint and log data that passes
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Figure 4.4: Iterative memory scanning with Cheat Engine
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through the function. The sensor then references the memory addresses of important data and
log the contents for further analysis. The next section will discuss the automation of the data
extraction.
4.3 Automate the Data Extraction
The reverse engineering stage provided the required memory addresses to apply function hooks and
extract the targeted sensor data. The final stage of the multistage sensor design process focuses on
automating the data extraction from the application. This is accomplished by developing a DLL
that can be injected into the application’s process at run time. This section will discuss coding the
actual sensor, the need for a development and deployment framework, and how to automatically
update the sensor when a software update is released.
4.3.1 Coding the Sensor
Sensors are dynamic-link libraries coded in unmanaged C++. Unmanaged C++ allows direct
access to pointers and in-lined assembly. When a sensor is injected into an application, the DLL
entry point is called. The following code segment shows the entry point for a DLL:
Code: DLL entry point
bool APIENTRY DllMain( HMODULE hModule,DWORD ul reason for call,LPVOID lpReserved){
switch (ul reason for call){
case DLL PROCESS ATTACH:
// create a thread of execution for the function ThreadFunc
CreateThread(0,0,(LPTHREAD START ROUTINE)ThreadFunc,0,0, 0);
break;
case DLL THREAD ATTACH:
break;
case DLL THREAD DETACH:
break;
case DLL PROCESS DETACH:
threadloop = false;
break;
}
return true;
}
The ThreadFunc() begins by calling an InitializeSensor() function. This function can be used
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to add any detours to the application. ThreadFunc() then enters a while loop that waits for a
signal to terminate. The while loop keeps the thread alive and periodically calls a pulse function
that can be used to perform operations that need to be called regularly. The frequency of this pulse
can be changed and is set to 100ms in the next code segment. Finally, the thread function calls
ShutdownSensor(). This is the point that detours are removed and the sensor performs necessary
garbage collection.
CODE: ThreadFunc()
void ThreadFunc() {
InitializeSensor();
while (threadloop)
{
PulseCall();
Sleep(100);
}
ShutdownSensor();
ExitThread(0);
}
One of the goals of the reverse engineering stage is to extract the memory addresses of important
functions that can be detoured. The following library function can be used to add a detour:
CODE: The addition of a detour
DetourFunctionWithEmptyTrampoline((PBYTE)cp tramp,(PBYTE)0x413424,(PBYTE)cp detour);
The first argument to this function is the address of the trampoline. This trampoline holds the
assembly code that was overwritten to add an unconditional jump to the detour function. The
second argument to this function is the extracted memory address that is being detoured, and the
third argument is the address to the detour function. Function detouring is useful for extracting
the augments passed to a function.
The second goal of the reverse engineering stage is to extract the memory addresses of critical
data. Accessing this critical data is fairly simple in code. In order to find this information a
programmer declares a pointer for the data type and casts the memory address into the pointer.
Next, they references the variable to obtain the data stored at that location.
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Finally, it is important to code the logic that directs the data pulled from the sensor to the
analysis center. Where the data is sent after it has been gathered depends on several factors. The
first factor is whether or not processing happens in real time. If not, the data can be logged to
a file. If the data is processed in real time, then the second factor of where to send the data is
to decide where the processing will take place. If the analysis happens inside the dynamic-link
library, then the logic for the analysis needs to be coded in as well. If the analysis happens in
a separate application on the host machine then some form of interprocess communication needs
to be added to the DLL. If the analysis happens on another machine, either a centrally located
server or distributed analysis computing cluster, then some form of network communication, such
as sockets, needs to be added to the DLL.
4.3.2 Signature Matching for Easy Update
When a vulnerability patch, feature enhancement, or any other software update is released, the
changed binary needs to be reversed again. To facilitate this process, signature matching, the same
technique antivirus scanners use to seek out malicious code, can be used. In the case of the memory
address of a function that is detoured, a signature of the function can be made. In the case of the
memory address of critical data, the signature of a section of code that accesses that critical data
can be constructed. If the proper signatures are constructed, pulling out the new memory addresses
is as simple as running a program that takes the binary and signature as an input and produces
the new memory addresses as an output. If the update modifies the section of code for which a
signature has been developed then signature scanning will not work. Through personal experience,
this is not the case the majority of the time.
4.3.3 Summary of Automating the Data Extraction
There are two main techniques for accessing the data. The first technique is to apply a detour on a
critical function to see how often it is called and what data passes through. The second technique
is to cast the memory address of critical data into a pointer and access the data stored at the
location. Both of these techniques can be used to efficiently sniff out sensor data. After coding
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the sensor, logic needs to be coded into the DLL to direct the sensed data to the analysis center.
Finally when a binary is updated, signature scanning can be used to automate the extraction of
the necessary memory addresses for this stage.
4.4 Analysis and Response
While the focus of this thesis is on the sensor step of the three step process described in Chapter
2, it is worth discussing the types of analysis and response that can be performed on the sensor
data. The analysis and response steps of the three step process are the core of the application level
cybersecurity defense. They give the extracted sensor data meaning. This also means they serve
no purpose without sensor data. There are many forms of analysis, such as signature, statistical,
and biological based methods. There are also many different types of responses, such as automatic
patching of vulnerable codes, killing an infected process, and notifying authorities of insider threats.
This section will briefly discuss some of the analysis and response methods that can be applied to
the extracted sensor data.
The process of scanning for code signatures was described in Chapter 2. This method can
be applied dynamically at the application level to code segments of running processes to detect
specific forms of malware or shell code that may have modified an application. Again, signature
based methods are effective for finding specific code segments but fail to polymorphism.
There are many biologically inspired analysis techniques that can be implemented on the data
set, such as genetic algorithms, artificial neural networks, and particle swarm optimization. These
methods look to nature for potential solutions. Genetic algorithms are evolutionary algorithms
used for optimization and search problems. Genetic algorithms could potentially be used to search
for classes of malware on a system. Artificial neural networks are a collection of nodes that simulate
biological neurons that can be trained to classify, filter, and cluster data. These neural networks
could potentially be used to differentiate between normal and anomalous behavior of an insider.
Particle swarm optimization is an application of swarm intelligence that looks for an optimal so-
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lution based a fitness function and several constraints. These constraints could be the global best
of a swarm, personal best of an individual in the population, or the local best of a small cluster of
elements in a swarm. Particle swarming analysis could be used to cluster insider behavior.
Another potential form of analysis is statistical analysis. Statistical analysis takes a quantitative
approach on the data. These methods attempt to extract knowledge by looking to the frequencies,
means, medians, and standard deviations of events. Statistical methods attempt to find correlations
between data sets. To do this it may perform regression analysis and attempt to find a function that
can fit the data with the least amount of error. Another approach would be to attempt to classify
groupings of data using naive Bayes classifiers. Each of these methods could be implemented to
understand the standard behavior of the internal workings of an application.
After analysis has been performed, there are many potential responses, including no action,
killing a process, denying access to a user, and notifying authorities. Each action will depend on
the nature of the threat. In the case of malware that has infected a system, it may be useful to
attempt to disable the malware by killing the process. In the case of an insider, the proper response
may be to notify the system administrators or managers. If analysis determines someone is trying
to hack a password, the system could temporarily disable the section of code that controls the
password check and lock the users ability to attempt to authenticate.
Different forms of analysis and response can be performed on the collected data. Ultimately,
the form of analysis depends on the nature of the threat and the type of data collected, and the
response depends on the results of the analysis. Experimentation with different forms of analysis
and response will be future work.
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter has focused on the multi-stage process of developing an application level domain
security sensor. The first stage is to determine what kind of data to collect. This decision depends
primarily on two factors, the security threat and application. The type of data collected is different
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if the security threat is an insider than if the security threat is malicious code. Choosing what data
to collect also depends on the application for which sensors are designed. The chosen application
should belong to the subset of programs that are on the system. Depending on the threat, it may
even belong to the subset of applications that the particular user runs.
The next stage is to reverse engineer the application. The intended goal is to extract the memory
addresses of functions that will be detoured and critical data. It is important to emphasize that this
is a form of cooperative reverse engineering that should not be required in the case of proprietary
applications. Proprietary applications should either release the source code, guarantee security, or
provide third party developers the proper hooks to add security after deployment.
The third stage is to automate the data extraction. This is accomplished by coding a dynamic-link
library that can be injected into an application at runtime. Several constructs exist for extracting
the necessary data from the process at run time, such as functional detours and casting the memory
address of a critical data element into a pointer. In the event of an application update, code can
be added to search out the signatures of the memory addresses extracted in the reverse engineering
stage.
Finally, this chapter discussed several of the techniques that can be used to perform analysis
and active response. The discussions of these techniques are intentionally brief because the focus
of this thesis is on the sensor step of the three step process. Different methods of analysis and
response will be explored in future work. The next two chapters will detail the experimental results
of developing sensors and deploying them.
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Chapter 5
Experimental Sensor: PuttySensor.dll
This chapter will discuss the implementation and results of the dynamic application level sensor
PuttySensor.dll. PuttySensor.dll is a dynamic link library that extracts user input data from the
target application. The collected data is then logged to a file. The type of attack this sensor could
potentially address is the insider threat. The user input data could be used to create a profile of
how the user interacts with the target program. After this profile has been created, analysis could
determine whether a user’s interaction with the application is within their normal usage patterns.
The first section will discuss the target application for the developed sensor.
5.1 Target Application
The target application for this sensor is Putty.exe. Putty.exe is an open source telnet and SSH client
for Microsoft Windows and Unix. The program is used to remotely login and control computers
across a network [50]. The application has many features that are controlled by a dialog window.
After the user has configured the session with their required options, they can connect to the remote
machine. At this point, a terminal window is opened and the configuration control window is closed.
The sensor developed in this chapter extracts only the users interaction with the configuration
window. Figure 5.1 shows a screenshot of the configuration window user interface of Putty.exe.
The left hand side of the window has a treeview control that displays different configuration pages,
and the right hand side has all of the configurations that fall into the selected page’s category.
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Figure 5.1: The Putty.exe configuration window
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5.2 Reverse Engineering Putty.exe
The second step of the three step process described in Chapter 2 is to reverse engineer the target
application. The Putty.exe application is a dialog window and makes many calls to Windows API
functions in user32.dll. Of all the functions called, GetDlgItem() and IsDlgButtonChecked() are
of particular interest. GetDlgItem() is called once for every user interface item to be displayed on
the page each time the user changes between pages, and IsDlgButtonChecked() is called every time
the user manipulates a checkbox or radio button. In order to extract the information necessary to
create a dynamic application level sensor, intermediate sensors need to be developed. These sensors
collect the input values passed to the functions.
The API documentation details the inputs and outputs of these two functions. Both GetDlgItem()
and IsDlgButtonChecked() take two parameters as input. The first parameter is an HWND pointer,
and the second parameter is the dialog item ID. This item ID is the targeted information for the
sensor.
Detours are applied to the two library functions, and the input parameters are extracted to
create the sensor data. In this example, the two target functions that will be detoured live within
the user32.dll library. This system library is loaded when the application is launched. Because
the target functions exist within a DLL themselves, the memory addresses for the target detour
functions need to be extracted dynamically. This is done by obtaining the base pointer of the library
within the virtual memory and calculating the effective address of the function to be detoured.
In order to calculate the effective address, the memory offset of the target function needs to be
extracted. This is accomplished by finding the base address for user32.dll in memory and the
address for the GetDlgItem() function in memory and subtracting the difference. Figure 5.2 shows
the IDA Pro screenshot of each of these memory addresses. The offset needed is calculated by
subtracting 0x77650000 from 0x77690BC5. The result is 0x40BC5. The following code segment
shows the dynamic effective address calculation using this offset to acquire the address of the
target function.
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Figure 5.2: Screenshot of the user32.dll base address and GetDlgItem() function address
Code: Dynamic effective address calculation of target function
DWORD dllhandle = (DWORD)GetModuleHandle(“user32.dll”);
checkDlgButtonFunction = dllhandle + 0x40bc5;
DetourFunctionWithEmptyTrampoline((PBYTE)GetDlgItem Tramp,(PBYTE)checkDlgButtonFunction,
(PBYTE)GetDlgItem Detour);
This process is repeated for IsDlgButtonChecked(), with a resulting offset of 0x2c927. From this
an intermediate sensor is developed and injected into the application. The detours are applied
when InitializedSensor() is called, and the sensor’s detour function, GetDlgItem Detour(), in-
tercepts the GetDlgItem() function each time it is called. The input parameters are then harvested
and used to develop the final sensor.
The output of the final sensor is an event log of the users’s interaction with the application.
These events are determined based on the item IDs passed to the two API functions. The next
section will discuss how the item IDs of the user interface pieces are used by intermediate sensors
and eventually turned into the final event log sensor.
5.3 Implementation
PuttySensor.dll extracts the input events of users within the application Putty.exe. The sensor logs
the data to a file called PuttySensor.txt. In order to capture the user input events, intermediate
sensors are used to discover the item IDs of items on each page. These items IDs are used in two
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ways in the final sensor.
First, GetDlgItem() is called for each user interface item when the page is changed. The in-
termediate sensor intercepts the function call with a detour and keeps a list of all of the item IDs
belonging to each page. Using these lists of IDs, hashes are computed for each page. The final
sensor implements the same detour and calculates a run time hash. The sensor then compares this
hash to the hash created with the intermediate sensor to determine which page the user selects.
When the determination is made, the event results are written to the log file.
Second, IsDlgButtonChecked() is called every time the user manipulates a radio button or a
check box. The input ID of the first call to IsDlgButtonChecked() is the ID of the newly selected
radio button or check box. The intermediate sensor is used to develop a list of user interface
elements and their IDs for each page. Using this information, the final sensor can query the results
from the intermediate sensor to determine which user interface piece is being activated. When the
determination is made, the event results are written to the log file. Figure 5.3 shows a popup menu
displaying the item ID for the user interface element, Telnet radio button, after it has been selected.
5.4 Results
The end result is a log file containing the input events of the application. The log file contains the
time of the event and the event message. Figure 5.4 is a screenshot of this log file after several
events have been captured.
The next step is to develop a tool that can take this log data and profile the user’s typical
behavior within this application in real time. The sensor could easily be modified to pass this data
directly to the analysis tool.
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Figure 5.3: Popup box displaying the item id of the user interface element selected
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Figure 5.4: Screenshot of the PuttySensor.txt log file produced by this sensor
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5.5 Conclusions
This chapter discusses PuttySensor.dll, which is an application level security sensor that attaches
to Putty.exe and extracts data describing the user’s interaction with the application. The sensor
creates a time stamped event log of the input to the program. Putty.exe is an open source telnet
and SSH client for Microsoft Windows and Unix. It is used for remote access to computers across
the Internet [50]. The sensor this chapter describes tracks the input to the configuration dialog box
of Putty.exe. Figure 5.1 on page 62 shows the user interface of this configuration window.
Using detours applied to the API functions GetDlgItem() and IsDlgItemChecked() an interme-
diate sensor is designed to extract the user interface element ID passed to each of these functions.
First, the effective addresses of these functions are calculated using the base address of the user32.dll
module in memory and an offset. Then, the offset is determined by subtracting the address of the
target function from the base address. Next, the intermediate sensor is injected into the applica-
tion, and these functions are detoured. Finally, the user interface item IDs are collected from the
application’s detoured API calls. The item IDs gathered from calls to GetDlgItem() are used to
create a hash that identifies which options page has been selected. The item IDs collected from
calls to IsDlgItemChecked() help determine the user interface element that has been manipulated
on the current page.
Ultimately, the output of this sensor could potentially train an anomaly detection system to
combat the insider threat problem. This is a task that could be explored in future work. The next
chapter will show an application of dynamic sensors that targets the malicious code threat.
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Chapter 6
Experimental Sensor:
FunctionTimer.dll
This chapter will discuss the implementation and results of the dynamic application level sensor
FunctionTimer.dll. FunctionTimer.dll is a dynamic-link library that extracts timing data on specific
functions within the targeted application. After timing data is collected, the results are logged to
a file. Additionally, manual analysis is performed on the log data. The attack threat this sensor
addresses is malicious code that modifies the functionality of the application. The hypothesis is
that the difference in timing results of the unmodified code and modified code will be statistically
noticeable. The first section will discuss the target application for the developed sensor.
6.1 Target Application
GuessNumber.exe is the targeted application, and it was developed for the purposes of this exper-
iment. This application is a simple number guessing game. It begins by prompting the user for
their name and then asks them to guess a number between 1 and 10. Afterwards, the application
generates a random number and compares it to the users guess. If the numbers match, the user
wins. If they do not match, the user loses, and the correct answer is displayed. This process is
looped until the user closes the application. GuessNumber.exe is unique because it is coded in such
a way that makes it vulnerable to a buffer overflow attack.
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Figure 6.1: GuessNumber.exe prompting the user for their name
Figure 6.2: Results of a complete cycle of GuessNumber.exe
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The following source code shows the targeted function that contains this vulnerability.
Code: Function Foo of GuessNumber.exe
void Foo(char *buf){
char buffer[10];
for (int i=0;i<10000;i++){}
strcpy(buffer, buf);
}
This function creates a static character array buffer of size 10 and performs an unsafe strcpy()
into that buffer. The source string is passed to the function as an argument. An extra loop exists
to extend the normal execution time for this function. Figure 6.1 and 6.2, on the previous page,
show the functionality of this game.
6.2 Reverse Engineering GuessNumber.exe
The GuessNumber.exe binary is reverse engineered in order to extract the memory address from the
function Foo(). This memory address is used to apply a functional detour that times the execution
of Foo(). GuessNumber.exe is simple enough that the location of Foo() was easily found by
searching the binary for the string “Pick a number 1 to 10.” This string is printed to the screen
after the targeted function is called. The following code segment is the assembly representation of
Foo().
Code: x86 Assembly Representation of Foo()
.text:0042D5A0 sub 42D5A0 // start of function
.text:0042D5A0 var 10 = dword ptr -10h // variable int i
.text:0042D5A0 var C = byte ptr -0Ch // variable buffer
.text:0042D5A0 arg 0 = dword ptr 8 // function arg char *buf
.text:0042D5A0
.text:0042D5A0 push ebp // preserve frame pointer
.text:0042D5A1 mov ebp, esp // mv stack ptr into frm ptr
.text:0042D5A3 sub esp, 50h // make room for stack frame
.text:0042D5A6 push ebx // push ebx to stack
.text:0042D5A7 push esi // push esi to stack
.text:0042D5A8 push edi // push edi for stack
.text:0042D5A9 mov [ebp+var 10], 0 // initialize int i to 0
.text:0042D5B0 jmp short loc 42D5BB // jump to loop init loop cmp
.text:0042D5B2 mov eax, [ebp+var 10] // put var i into eax
.text:0042D5B5 add eax, 1 // increment eax
.text:0042D5B8 mov [ebp+var 10], eax // put eax back into var i
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.text:0042D5BB cmp [ebp+var 10], 2710h // compare i 10000d (2710h)
.text:0042D5C2 jge short loc 42D5C6 // if i >= 10000d jump out of loop
.text:0042D5C4 jmp short loc 42D5B2 // else continue loop
.text:0042D5C6 mov eax, [ebp+arg 0] // move char *buf into eax
.text:0042D5C9 push eax // push to stack for upcoming fnc call
.text:0042D5CA lea ecx, [ebp+var C] // load address of buffer into ecx
.text:0042D5CD push ecx // push to stack for upcoming fnc call
.text:0042D5CE call sub 42B703 // call to strcpy()
.text:0042D5D3 add esp, 8 // clean up stack after strcpy()
.text:0042D5D6 pop edi // restore edi from stack
.text:0042D5D7 pop esi // restore esi from stack
.text:0042D5D8 pop ebx // restore ebx from stack
.text:0042D5D9 mov esp, ebp // move frame ptr into stack ptr
.text:0042D5DB pop ebp // restore ebp from stack
.text:0042D5DC retn // function ends
This is indeed the target function, and the memory address of the function is 0x42D5A0. The
next section describes how this memory address is used to implement the sensor.
6.3 Implementation
The reverse engineering stage provided the necessary information to develop the sensor. When the
dynamic-link library is injected into the process, the InitializeSensor() function is called. This
function deploys a detour on the Foo() function of the application using the extracted memory
address, 0x42D5A0. The code for this detour is shown in the following code segment:
Code: Function detour added to 0x42D5A0
DetourFunctionWithEmptyTrampoline((PBYTE)cp tramp,(PBYTE)0x42D5A0,(PBYTE)cp detour);
When the Foo() function is called within the application, execution is redirected to the cp detour
() function. The detour function uses the x86 assembly instruction RDTSC to capture the number
of processor ticks since reset. Next, the detour function calls Foo(). To determine the number of
processor ticks for Foo(), the RDTSC instruction is called again after Foo() returns. Then the result
is subtracted from the initial call. At this point, the clock frequency can be used to determine
the execution time of the function with nanosecond scale precision. Should Foo() fail to return,
the PulseCall() function, which runs within the sensors thread, can act as a watchdog timer and
calculate the timing difference.
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Advances in CPU architectures have diluted the accuracy of the RDTSC timing method. First,
in multi-core architectures, each core has its own time stamp counter (TSC) register. This is
overcome by the fact that the timing is executed within the injected sensor, which runs as a thread
on a particular core. Second, the method does not account for context switches, which can inflate
the timing of the function. This problem is overcome in the analysis stage by computing the average
timing of the Foo() function. Third, out of order execution can cause the RDTSC instruction to not
issue when expected. This can be solved by adding a serializing function like CPUID. Finally, many
laptops have power saving technologies that speed up or slow down the CPU frequency to conserve
the battery. When this occurs, the timing results will be off potentially skewing the sensor results.
The computer on which these experiments were run on does not have this power saving feature [51].
After timing results are calculated, the sensor logs the data for analysis. At this point the sensor
could be developed to automatically forward the data to the analysis center. However, the focus
of this thesis is on the dynamic application level sensors and not the analysis and response steps.
Future work will explore analysis and response in more detail. Additionally, the sensor implements
a watchdog timer that functions at the millisecond scale to determine if Foo() has failed to return
from execution. This is important considering one of the attacks described in the next section
prevents Foo() from returning.
6.4 Attack Vectors
This section details two attack vectors for the targeted function Foo(). The first attack vector is a
code tamper attack. The code of the targeted function is manipulated in such a way that modifies
the functionality, resulting in abnormal timings. The second attack vector is a buffer overflow
attack. The return address of the stack frame is overwritten resulting in the execution of shellcode
on the stack. In this case, Foo() does not return.
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6.4.1 Code Tamper Attack
The first type of attack developed for GuessNumber.exe is a code tamper attack. The functionality
of the code is altered in memory at run time. There are several ways this could happen, such
as the injection and redirection of code execution or the actual modification of the existing code.
The attack developed for GuessNumber.exe modifies the existing code of the function. It changes
the number of loop iterations from 10000 to 30000. This is accomplished through an API call
to WriteProcessMemory(). This function call writes a buffer to a specified memory location in
a targeted process. In this case, the targeted process is the GuessNumber.exe process. Figure
6.3 shows the graph view of the assembly code before the modification, and Figure 6.4 shows the
assembly code after the modification.
6.4.2 Buffer Overflow Attack
Buffer overflow vulnerabilities are the result of an application reading or writing beyond the end
of an array. Attackers exploit these vulnerabilities to force the execution of malicious shellcode on
a remote system. There are several techniques to exploit a buffer overflow, such as arc injection,
pointer subterfuge, and heap smashing. However, the most common technique is the “stack smash-
ing” approach. This is when the overrun buffer writes into the stack frame of the current function
and replaces the return address with the address of their shellcode [37].
The function Foo() contains a “stack smashing” buffer overflow vulnerability. This is the result
of the small static buffer and the unsafe string copy function, strcpy(). Shellcode can be inserted
in place of the name to force a buffer overflow. The following is an example of shellcode that will
cause the buffer to overflow and overwrite the return function of the current stack frame.
Code: Hexadecimal representation of buffer overflow shellcode for function Foo()
“\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\xEB\xF0\xFC\xFE\x12”
Figures 6.5 and 6.6 show the stack before and after the shellcode has been pasted in for the name.
74
Figure 6.3: Assembly code of Foo() prior to the code tamper attack
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Figure 6.4: Assembly code of Foo() after the code tamper attack
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Figure 6.5: Stack before buffer overflow
Figure 6.6: Stack after buffer overflow
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The ASCII representation of the shell code, which is shown in the above code segment, is pasted
into GuessNumber.exe when the user is prompted for their name. The shellcode begins executing
after the Foo() function returns. The code is returned to the new overwritten return address. A
breakpoint was inserted to allow line by line execution. The shellcode does nothing more than hang
execution in a loop on the stack. Figure 6.7 shows the assembly instruction sequence executing on
the stack.
6.5 Results
The sensor is injected into the GuessNumber.exe process and the timing data is accumulated. Next,
the attacks are executed and the sensor collects data through these events. This section will detail
the results of the dynamic application level sensor FunctionTimer.dll.
Figure 6.7: Shellcode executing on the stack
78
6.5.1 Results of Code Tamper Attack
The results of the code tamper attack supported the hypothesis. Prior to the code tamper attack,
the timing results were approximately 30,500 ns. After the code tamper attack, the timing results
jumped to approximately 90,500 ns. This can be seen in Table 6.1 on the next page.
The average normal time for this experiment is 30,534 ns with a standard deviation of 880 ns.
When the tamper attack is launched, the average time for the tamper timings is 90701 ns. This is
represents a z-score that is 68.39 standard deviations away. The hypothesis is that the difference
in timing results of the unmodified code and modified code is statistically noticeable. These results
indicated that this is indeed the case. Figure 6.8 shows the scatter plot of the timing results from
the tamper attack. This analysis was produced from the log files of the FunctionTimer.dll sensor.
While the analysis performed on the produced data set was done by hand, the eventual goal is to
perform automatic analysis in real time and use the results to actively respond to threats.
Figure 6.8: Scatter plot of the timing results of the tamper attack
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Table 6.1: Observed Execution Times for 32 Runs with a Code Tamper Attack at Run 27
Run Time(ns) Observation
1 30674.26 Normal
2 30565.97 Normal
3 30481.74 Normal
4 30385.48 Normal
5 30538.90 Normal
6 30301.25 Normal
7 30307.27 Normal
8 30385.48 Normal
9 30454.67 Normal
10 30490.77 Normal
11 30379.46 Normal
12 30301.25 Normal
13 30499.79 Normal
14 30421.58 Normal
15 30295.23 Normal
16 30415.56 Normal
17 30301.25 Normal
18 30295.23 Normal
19 30620.12 Normal
20 30385.48 Normal
21 30385.48 Normal
22 30394.50 Normal
23 30064.47 Normal
24 30478.73 Normal
25 30400.52 Normal
26 30789.00 Normal
27 90744.31 Tamper Attack
28 90687.16 Tamper Attack
29 90774.39 Tamper Attack
30 90596.91 Tamper Attack
31 90750.33 Tamper Attack
32 90654.07 Tamper Attack
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6.5.2 Results of Buffer Overflow Attack
The results of the buffer overflow attack were also as expected. The buffer overflow causes the
program to hang in a loop on the stack. As a result execution never returns from the function
Foo(). This causes the periodic check to see if the function has returned to fail. When this check
fails, the sensor calculates the time since the start of Foo() and updates the event log. The user is
also notified of the event with an alert. This alert can be seen in Figure 6.9. Finally, after the attack
has occurred, the application needs to be restarted because execution is stuck in the shellcode.
The timing results of normal execution and the timeout of the Foo() function can be seen in
Table 6.2. The results are as expected; an average normal execution time of 30,697 ns with a
standard deviation of 1237 ns. The z-score of the timed out buffer overflow attack represents a
z-score of 19821.59 standard deviations. Figure 6.10 shows the scatter plot of the execution time
versus run number.
Figure 6.9: The watchdog timer detects that Foo() never returns and alerts the user.
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Table 6.2: Observed Execution Times for 32 Runs with a Buffer Overflow attack at Run 32
Run Time(ns) Observation
1 30593.04 Normal
2 30301.25 Normal
3 30490.77 Normal
4 30550.93 Normal
5 30391.50 Normal
6 30316.29 Normal
7 33258.28 Normal
8 30496.78 Normal
9 30295.23 Normal
10 30394.50 Normal
11 30400.52 Normal
12 30484.75 Normal
13 36871.08 Normal
14 30415.56 Normal
15 30475.72 Normal
16 30304.26 Normal
17 30292.23 Normal
18 30298.24 Normal
19 30391.50 Normal
20 30448.65 Normal
21 30406.54 Normal
22 30328.32 Normal
23 30568.98 Normal
24 30466.70 Normal
25 30295.23 Normal
26 30301.25 Normal
27 30292.23 Normal
28 30322.31 Normal
29 30298.24 Normal
30 30385.48 Normal
31 30457.68 Normal
32 24582366.57 Buffer Overflow Attack
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Figure 6.10: Scatter plot of the timing results of the buffer overflow attack
6.6 Conclusions
This chapter discussed the implementation and results of the dynamic application level sensor
FunctionTimer.dll. This sensor collects timing data on the execution time of the target function.
In the case of FunctionTimer.dll, the target function is Foo(), which resides in GuessNumber.exe.
GuessNumber.exe is a guessing game application that was developed specifically for the purposes of
these experiments. The memory address of the function Foo() is extracted by reverse engineering
the binary. Using this memory address, a sensor is developed and deployed. This sensor uses the
TSC register to calculate the number of ticks since reboot before and after the Foo() function is
called. From this and the processor frequency, the timing of the function is calculated and recorded.
Additionally, a periodic timer checks to make sure the Foo() function has returned.
Two experiments tested they hypothesis that the difference in timing results of the unmodified
code and modified code will be statistically noticeable. The sensor is injected into to the application
at run time and normal timing data is collected. After a certain number of runs, two different
attacks are launched on the application. The first attack is a code tamper attack that modifies the
functionality of the Foo() function. This causes it to take three times longer to execute. The sensor
data verifies this, and the change point is easily identifiable. The resulting execution time has a
z-score of 68.39, which is statistically significant. The second attack is a buffer overflow attack that
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overwrites the return pointer of the current stack frame, causing shellcode to execute on the stack.
As a result, Foo() never returns from execution, and the watchdog timer of the sensor captures this
event. The user is notified, and the time captured by the watchdog timer is logged. The execution
time of Foo() is theoretically infinity since it never finishes execution. However, the watchdog is
set in place to prevent this.
The work presented in this thesis focuses on the sensors and not the analysis or response. Some
of the future work in this area will be to automatically perform analysis on the collected data. The
FunctionTimer.dll sensor shows another the type of data that can be collected with an application
level security sensor.
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Chapter 7
Summary and Conclusion
The work presented in this thesis introduced the concept of dynamic application level sensors
produced via reverse engineering and implemented via process injection. Dynamic application level
security sensors provide the opportunity to use a finer granularity of data to make informed decisions
about potential cyberthreats. Adding these new sensors to the existing defense in depth scheme
can further strengthen the overall security of cyberspace. First, this chapter will summarize the
existing defense techniques and examine where dynamic application level sensors fit in the overall
security design. Second, it will recap on the technologies required to develop and implement these
fine grain sensors. Third, it will review the results of the two examples, PuttySensor.dll and
FunctionTimer.dll. Fourth, it will discuss the ethical implications of this work, and finally it will
conclude with future work in the area.
7.1 Summary
Cyberspace is a large dynamic network of hardware, software, operating systems, data, and people.
The sophisticated complexity of this network makes protecting it an ambitious task. Cyberattacks
are growing exponentially in numbers. Along with this increase in the number of attacks is an
increase in the sophistication of the attacks. Attackers are constantly looking for new ways to com-
promise systems. The motives behind these attacks include revenge, sabotage, terrorism, money,
and political purposes.
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Threats manifest at many different security domains throughout cyberspace. To combat these
threats, layered defenses, such as defense in depth security strategies have become the standard. The
combination of hardware and software security measures at the different levels of the cyberspace
domain has provided the best protection currently available. The network level offers firewalls,
switches, and network intrusion detection systems based on signatures and anomaly detection
algorithms. The host level offers protection via antivirus scanners, system integrity verifiers, and
other security measures that monitor activity on a given computer system. The common theme
between the network and host level security domains, is that they follow a generic three step process.
First, they collect data from sensors. Second, they process the data, and finally, they respond to any
potential threats. This three step process is lacking at the application level. Defenses at this level
focus on secure coding practices and patching vulnerable code. Unfortunately, this is not sufficient
to protect against the complex attacks common in cyberspace. The work presented in this thesis
targets application level security. It proposes adding the three step process at the application level
starting with sensors. The sensors are dynamically added to the application at run time using a
form of code injection.
There are several forms of code injection, such as SQL, XSS, and DLL methods. Of the forms
described in Chapter 3, dynamic-link library injection is unique, because it allows code to execute
within the virtual memory space of a targeted process. Execution within the virtual memory
space of a remote process grants the DLL access to run time application data that is not normally
accessible to other applications. There are many ways to implement DLL injection. Of these
methods, the two most common are Windows APIs and Windows hooks. Windows APIs work by
issuing the proper sequence of functions provided by the operating system. Windows hooks work
by hooking messages for local and remote processes. Detecting code injection partially depends
on the method of injection. Some forms of injection are easier to detect than others. Chapter
3 detailed different ways to detect code injection, but there are stills ways to avoid detection if
stealthy execution is a required feature of the injection.
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Existing applications of dynamic-link library injection are malware, functionality additions, de-
bugging, and performance profiling. The Storm computer worm was an example of a piece of
malware that used a form of code injection similar to DLL injection to execute stealthily. MMORe-
lay is an example of DLL injection developed to add new functionality to an existing software
system. The work presented in this thesis introduces a new application of dynamic-link library
injection focused on cybersecurity. This new application injects security modules into applications
at run time to help protect them. In order to accomplish this, the sensors must be developed.
Developing dynamic application level sensors is a multi-stage process. The first stage is to
determine what data needs to be collected. This determination is dependant on the targeted
security threat and the application chosen to defend against. The next stage is to reverse engineer
the application to extract the memory addresses for target functions that can be detoured and
critical data that can be directly accessed. The reverse engineering process is a feedback cycle of
static and dynamic analysis that results in intermediate sensors that can assist in the next iteration
of dynamic analysis. The end result is the necessary memory addresses for the next stage, which
is to automate the data extraction.
Data extraction is accomplished by writing the actual sensor. The sensor implements any function
detours and applies any processing required to report the targeted data. At this stage, the logic
can be added to direct the output of the sensor to the analysis and response steps of the three step
process. This thesis does not focus on the analysis and response steps, however, future work will
likely explore these steps. This process was implemented on two sensors to show the kind of data
that can be extracted with dynamic application level sensors.
Chapter 5 introduced PuttySensor.dll, which is an application level sensor that targets the
insider threat. It collects user input data to the program Putty.exe, which is an open source
SSH and Telnet client for Windows and UNIX. The putty sensor detours GetDlgItem() and
IsDlgButtonChecked() in order to determine what the user is doing within the application. When-
ever a user changes pages or manipulates a user interface element, the sensor reports the action in
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an event log. An anomaly detection system could train on the output of this sensor to profile the
normal behavior of the user within the target application. It could then respond to any deviations
of this profiled normal behavior.
Chapter 6 introduced the next sensor which was FunctionTimer.dll. This sensor collected timing
data on the execution of functions within an application. The hypothesis was that the timing
results of the unmodified code and modified code would be statistically noticeable. To test this
hypothesis, the application GuessNumber.exe was created. The program prompts the user for their
name and a number between 1 and 10. The program itself was coded in such a way to be vulnerable
to several types of attacks. The experiment launched two attacks on the program. The first attack
tampered with the logic of a timed function. The result was a timing that took three times longer
than normal to execute. This longer execution time represented a z-score of over 68 standard
deviations away. The second attack was a buffer overflow that smashed the return pointer of the
stack frame and forced the execution of shellcode on the stack. The result was the target timed
function never returned, triggering the watchdog timer the sensor implemented. The attacks were
noticeable through change points in the timing logs the sensor produced. There is much potential
future work in this field. The next section will detail several directions in which this work could go.
7.2 Future Work
The work presented in this thesis opens the door for many possibilities of additional work. First,
different forms of analysis and response need to be explored in an effort to make use of the powerful
fine-grain data dynamic application level sensors provide.
Second, many more sensors could be designed. This would allow for a robust defense at the
application level. Ideally, sensors would run within each process on the system. They would
monitor the health of the process and defend against threats both internal and external to the host
and particular application.
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Third, a robust framework should be developed to facilitate the design of these sensors. This
framework should have two parts. The first part is the development center, which would provide
APIs for rapidly creating and testing sensors. It would also help automate the reverse engineering
process as much as possible. The second part is the deployment functionality of the framework. The
deployment functionality actually performs the DLL injection and keeps track of which sensors are
loaded in which applications and processes. It would allow system administrators control over the
sensors, analysis, and response. A large part of the framework should be a high quality visualization
capability that assists system administrators in understanding what the status of the system is at
any given time. This visualization capability would also have the necessary user interface controls
to launch or remove sensors to the system.
Finally, additional work could focus on new methods of stealthy execution. This is of particular
interest because targeting the insider threat means the system should be transparent to the user.
In general, a system such as the one proposed in this thesis would be invisible to the average
user. However, advanced users could still track down and disable the system. To prevent this, new
methods of stealthy executions could be explored in future work.
The goal of the reverse engineering stage is to extract memory locations for critical data elements
and functions that can be hooked. This section will focus on the reverse engineering process, and
detail the tools and methods used to extract the required data for the security sensor.
7.3 Ethical Implications of this Work
The work presented in this thesis has ethical implications that need to be considered. The preface
noted that the techniques described in this document could potentially be used to develop harmful
sensors. Is it right to develop a framework that facilitates code injection and application level data
mining, even if its intended use is to defend? Are the ethical implications of this same as the
invention of dynamite? Dynamite is extremely useful in applications, such as clearing rock for the
development of roads and the demolition of buildings. However, it can also be used to do harm.
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Other ethical implications to consider involve privacy. For Example:
• If Person X owns a computer and Person Y uses it, is it right to develop a sensor to monitor
Person Y’s activity?
• What limits of privacy should Person Y expect?
• How does the relationship between Person X and Person Y effect the ethics?
• What if Person Y is a minor and Person X is their guardian?
• What if Person X is a public library providing free internet access?
• What if Person X is a company that wishes to monitor their employee?
• What obligation does Person X have to keep the information confidential? How confidential?
• Can another employee access the collected data if they are working on behalf of the employer?
• Should the employer monitor the actions of the employee in charge of monitoring other em-
ployees?
• Should Person X disclose to Person Y that they are being monitored?
• If so, how much detail should be disclosed about what is being monitored?
• The type of data that could potentially be collected through application level security sensors
is personally identifiable information, such as passwords, social security numbers, and credit
card numbers. How should this data be handled?
These are just a few of the ethical questions that should be considered when developing and
implementing dynamic application level security sensors. Ultimately, there are no definitive answers
to these questions. The answers depend on the situation and the individuals involved. There are
many code of ethics that can be applied to each of these scenarios, but in the end the answer
depends on the interpretation.
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7.4 Conclusion
The need for stronger application level security domain defenses is apparent. Secure code practices
and vulnerability patching are not sufficient. Attackers are regularly probing enterprise networks
looking for vulnerabilities. If they are successful, the results can be costly. The work presented in
this theses proposes the use of dynamic-link library injection and reverse engineering to dynamically
add security sensors to applications at run time. These sensors further fortify the defense-in-depth
security strategy. They can be used to access a previously untapped source of fine-grain data and
should be incorporated into normal operations of system administrators. It is not the absolute
solution to the rising cyber security problems, but it is a previously missing piece of the solution.
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Appendix A
Screenshots of Reverse Engineering
Tools
This section displays the screenshots of several of the reverse engineering tools described in this
thesis.
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Figure A.1: Screenshot of the disassembler, IDA Pro
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Figure A.2: Screenshot of the memory editor, Winhack 2.0
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Figure A.3: Screenshot of memory editor and disassembler, Cheat Engine 5.5
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Figure A.4: Screenshot of the jump calculator, JumpCalc
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Figure A.5: Screenshot of the compiler, Visual Studio 2008
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